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ABSTRACT
Mega sporting event hosting and sponsorship garner billions of dollars in
investments from countries and companies, but their effectiveness has yet to be
definitively determined. If the announcement of a host country serves as a signal to the
investors who comprise a market, then there should be an increased return in response to
the announcement. Similarly, if companies are activating their sponsorships during a
sporting event there may be a higher return than what would be expected otherwise. The
evaluation of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games held in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates that
the announcement did not impact the market of Brazil, or of the other countries who were
under consideration using rate of return, log returns and seemingly unrelated regression
models. There were abnormal cumulative abnormal returns that may indicate that it takes
time for mega-events to exert an economic benefit. Further evaluation using similar
techniques for the sponsoring companies of different levels did not demonstrate a
difference in returns based on sponsorship, but did indicate that brand affiliation has a
negative effect and being a sport company has a positive effect. These results further the
academic literature regarding market perspectives and sport mega-events.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
According to industry sponsorship leader, International Events Group (IEG),
worldwide sport sponsorship spending reached $62.7 Billion in 2017 and was forecast to
reach $66 Billion in 2018, with North American companies projected to account for
$24.2 Billion of that estimate (2018). This was an increase of over 25% from 2012 when
$51 Billion was spent on sponsorship internationally with $19 Billion spent in North
America (Crompton, 2015). Within this worldwide sport sponsorship environment, two
events captured a tremendous amount of the world’s attention not only when they were
held, but also for an extended period of time prior to and after completion.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) captures a sizeable share of the
worldwide sport sponsorship spending by hosting summer and winter Olympics. For the
four-year sponsorship timeframe that culminated in the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic
Games, total Olympic sponsorship revenue exceeded $3.5 billion. The 12 Olympic
Program (TOP) sponsors, cumulatively paid over $1 billion for their 2016 Summer
Olympic Games sponsorships (Olympics, 2019). In addition, the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) collected $70.3 million in US Olympic team sponsorships in the
2015-16 run-up to the Rio Olympics (IEG, 2016).
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The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) hosts a number of
international soccer matches, but all pale in comparison to the World Cup. Held every
four years, the World Cup captures the globe’s imagination. In 2018, over 3.5 billion
people watched at least some of the tournament. Over 1 billion fans watched the final
match (France v. Croatia) (FIFA, 2018). In most countries, the men’s national team
partners with a number of high-level sponsors and in countries where the national team
has achieved consistent success, the sponsorship revenues can be tremendous. For
example, in Brazil, where the national team is typically successful and has a passionate
following, sponsorships exceeded $130 million in 2016, despite corruption allegations
(Kunti, 2017).
For both mega-events, as well as all other well-executed sponsorship agreements,
in addition to the money spent on sponsorship to obtain rights fees are the additional
costs accumulated in leveraging the sponsorship, with previous research indicating that a
range between 1:1 to 7:1 is an appropriate ratio (IEG, 2018; O’Reilly & Horning, 2013).
The rights fees and leveraging costs mean that official sponsors are often investing tens
of millions of dollars to associate with the world’s top sporting events and the athletes
and teams who compete to win medals and championships.
For organizations to continually secure sponsorships, they must financially justify
sponsors’ investment, with producing a positive return often a priority (Myazaki &
Morgan, 2001). Shareholder wealth is a key objective of publicly traded organizations, as
is increasing a company’s share price (Moyer, McGuigan & Rao, 2015). However, for
some businesses that pursue sponsorships, it is often not clear they are able to achieve
positive financial returns. Some consumers incorrectly identify the official sponsor of an
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event which undermines a sponsor’s objective to enhance brand image and recognition
resulting from the event (Pavitt, 2016). Though there have been a number of empirical
studies that have sought to evaluate a sport sponsorship’s ability to positively impact
share price (Cornwell, Pruitt, & Clark, 2005; Hino & Takeda, 2019; Kim, Jung, & Lee,
2013), Dietz, Evans, and Hansen (2012) contend sponsorship may actually generate
negative financial returns. In the case of the Olympic Games, there has been some
analysis of TOP sponsorship outcomes (Baim, Goukasian, & Misch, 2015; Farrell &
Frame, 1997; Myazaki & Morgan, 2001; Samitas, Kenourgios, & Zounis, 2008), but little
is known about sponsors who partner at a lower financial commitment or for ambushers
who attempt to confuse consumers into thinking they are official partners when in reality
they are not. For the World Cup, little research has been completed examining
sponsorships’ impact on share price (Hundt & Horsch, 2019). In a business environment
where more and more analysis is conducted prior to making any decision, this lack of
information regarding stock market returns for sport sponsors and ambushers is
concerning for corporations looking for a market advantage, particularly in the case of the
Olympic Games and the World Cup, where worldwide media attention is generated and
sponsors make a considerable investment to be involved.
For many sponsors, partnering with the Olympics, World Cup, and other mega-events is
seen as an opportunity to be associated with a strong event (Seguin & O’Reilly, 2008).
Marketing executives and corporations consummate these deals in the belief that the
event will help achieve their objectives, including increased cash flow and future sales,
thus providing a positive return to the shareholders of the sponsoring corporation (Clark,
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Cornwell & Pruitt, 2009). The belief that a sponsorship will lead to enhanced shareholder
wealth is a major reason for such sponsorship activities (Leeds, Leeds & Pistolet, 2007).
1.1 PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it examines the reaction of the
Brazilian stock market to the unique situation of the country being announced as the host
of the 2014 World Cup in 2007 and then subsequently Rio de Janeiro being awarded the
2016 Olympic Games in 2009. Hosting these two events in such close proximity is
unique in the modern sport environment and offers an opportunity to explore stock
market reactions. In addition, the second component of the dissertation will utilize an
event-study methodology to assess the stock market returns for companies of varying
sponsorship levels over the duration of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics and beyond.
Specifically, this project is designed to evaluate the outcome of stock returns of identified
TOP sponsors, USOC sponsors and selected ambush marketers. This portion of the
dissertation attempts to identify if there are firm-level characteristics that predict
abnormal returns across companies in the sample to ascertain what factors predict
performance to help sponsoring companies better position themselves in the Olympic
marketing space.
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY
Although mega-events draw hundreds of millions of dollars in sponsorship
revenues to the host organization, their impact on the host country is uncertain (Berman,
Brooks, & Davidson, 2000; Leeds, Mirikitani, & Tang, 2009; Veraros, Kasimati, &
Dawson, 2004). The uniqueness of Brazil as a back-to-back mega-event host country
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(2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games) was discussed as a way to
demonstrate and highlight Brazil as a political and economic world power (Tomlinson,
Bass, & Bassett, 2011). In order to effectively host the World Cup and Summer Olympic
Games, Brazil had to invest in the requisite stadia and infrastructure development, which
was a means of enhancing economic development (Maharaj, 2015). This double hosting
provides an opportunity to examine the impact of multiple host country announcements
on a single country’s stock market. Moreover, allegations of corruption for the awarding
of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games were revealed (Panja, 2019), adding additional
insight to the impact corruption has on international stock markets if a positive return is
present.
The results of this study will help inform sport marketers, managers and megaevent operators about the potential incremental financial impact of a sponsorship’s ability
to increase shareholder wealth. An important potential unique contribution of the
sponsorship portion of the paper is the inclusion of both official TOP and USOC
sponsors, as well as non-sponsor, ambushing companies in the analysis. It is expected
that official sponsors should outperform ambushers based on their affiliation and ability
to activate the sponsorship during the Games to maximize impact. However, it has been
suggested that ambushers may clutter the market in terms of consumer recognition
(Seguin & O’Reilly, 2008), so it is possible that the decision to ambush the Olympic
Games may lead to an increase in returns that would have been unexpected otherwise.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section will summarize the history of the FIFA World Cup and Olympic
Games, detail the theoretical foundations for an examination of stock price returns and
utilization of event studies. Subsequent sections will elucidate research methodologies,
summarize study results, outline conclusions, and discuss theoretical and practical
implications.
2.1 MEGA-EVENTS
A sporting event is considered a mega-event if it is a one-time or recurring event that
enhances the international awareness of the location (Andersson, Rustad, & Solberg,
2004). A more recent definition put forth by Muller (2015) is that ‘mega-events are
ambulatory occasions of a fixed duration that attract a large number of visitors, have a
large mediated reach, come with large costs and have large impacts on the built
environment and population’ (p. 638). Within this framework, this paper focuses on two
mega-sport-events: the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games.
2.1.1 FIFA WORLD CUP
Following the success of the Olympic Football Tournament in 1924 and 1928, the
FIFA Executive Committee made the decision to organize its own world championship
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(FIFA, 2020). Hosting bids were submitted by Hungary, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands,
Sweden and Uruguay, with Uruguay ultimately prevailing in no small part from its
national association’s willingness to cover all costs for hosting, as well as sharing any
profit and covering any financial deficits. Subsequently, the first World Cup match was
held in the newly constructed Estadio Centenario in Montevideo in 1930. Since European
national teams had to travel a long distance to compete, and European clubs had to
continue playing without their best players for two months, only four European countries
fielded highly competitive teams: France, Belgium, Romania and the former Yugoslavia.
The tournament was won by host Uruguay, and despite it not truly being a “world event”
given the lack of all the top worldwide players, the World Cup was deemed a success.
Interestingly, Uruguay refused to defend their title four years later, becoming the first and
only championship team to fail to participate in the subsequent World Cup.
The membership of FIFA steadily increased from 51 countries in the late 1930’s
to 73 in 1950 to over 200 in 2007 (FIFA, 2020). Following World War II, the
proliferation of television aided the World Cup’s expansion. The 1974 election of Dr.
Joao Havelange as FIFA president helped to spur additional football growth as he led the
organization from simply hosting the World Cup every four years to becoming a global
brand with actions and events occurring around the world on a regular basis. As the sport
developed and became more popular, so did World Cup tournaments, with 24 teams takin
part in 1982 and 32 gaining entrance in 1998 (FIFA, 2020).
Though the first World Cup featured 13 teams with a total attendance of 570,549
fans (FIFA, 2019), by 2014, when the World Cup was played in Brazil, the number of
teams had increased to 32 with total attendance of 3,429,873 (FIFA, n. d.). Moreover,
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FIFA invested more than $850 million organizing the 2014 World Cup with Brazil
receiving estimated tax revenue increases of $7.2 billion (FIFA, n. d.). To aid the recent
growth of the World Cup, FIFA has elicited the help of international corporations through
their sponsorship and marketing efforts with the stated objective of “generating the
revenues that enable FIFA to continue developing football everywhere and for everyone”
(FIFA, 2019, p. 4).
In 1982, FIFA had nine worldwide corporate sponsors: Coca-Cola, Canon,
Fujifilm, Gillette, Iveco, JVC, Metaxa, RJ Reynolds, and Seiko (FIFA fact sheet, n. d.).
The number of sponsorships expanded to 15 by 2006, when FIFA reorganized its
sponsorship opportunities into different tiers. Currently, there are three levels of
sponsorship: FIFA Partners (highest-level), FIFA World Cup sponsors (mid-level), and
regional partners (lowest-level) – four sponsors per international region: Europe, North
and Central America, South America, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia (FIFA,
2019). The 2014 FIFA World Cup had six FIFA Partners (Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates,
Hyunda Kia, SONY and Visa), each of whom paid an estimated $25-50 million per year
(Smith, 2014). In addition, eight FIFA World Cup sponsors, including: Anheuser-Busch,
Castrol, Continental, Johnson & Johnson, McDonalds, Oi, Seara and Yingli Solar each
paid an estimated $10-25 million per year (Smith, 2014). Six lower-level national
sponsors also participated: Apex-Brazil, Garoto, Centauro, Banco Itau, Liberty Seguros,
Wiseup (FIFA, n. d.). Currently, FIFA Partners include: Adidas, Coca-Cola, Wanda,
Hyundai Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa (FIFA, 2019), with Coca-Cola being the only
continuous partner since 1982.
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During the World Cup cycle from 2011 to 2014, estimates place total annual
sponsorship investment for the six FIFA Partners at $177 million annually, or roughly
$30 Million per corporation (Wilson, 2015). However, following the 2014 World Cup,
FIFA was confronted by a corruption scandal involving seven FIFA executives. Charges
of racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering relating to bids for the 2018 World Cup
in Russia and the 2022 World Cup in Qatar were levied (Hawkins, 2015). While some of
the FIFA Partners voiced initial concern and Visa threatened to back out of its contract,
they ultimately decided to remain due to the popularity of the World Cup (Hawkins,
2015). Not all the companies felt that way, however, as two of the 2014 FIFA Partner
sponsors, Sony and Emirates, decided not to renew their sponsorship (Gibson, 2015).
Additionally, three of the eight FIFA World Cup sponsors also decided not to renew their
sponsorships, Castrol, Continental and Johnson & Johnson, which prompted FIFA to
restructure its sponsorship program to include more regional partners (Gibson, 2015).
While the Brazil World Cup yielded $1.63 billion in sponsorship revenue, the Russia
World Cup saw that decrease to $1.45 billion, with much of the decrease likely a result of
the previous administrative corruption (Chapman, 2018). FIFA’s scandal helped to
highlight one of the risks of sponsorship: poor ethical behavior of the organizer can be
reflected back on the sponsor. Despite this, FIFA projects a $100 million budget surplus
for years 2019-2022 despite lower attendance and hospitality estimates for the Qatar
World Cup than previous World Cup host countries that contested matches in larger
stadiums (Dunbar, 2018).
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2.1.2 THE MODERN OLYMPIC GAMES
The modern Olympic Games were first organized in 1896 by Pierre de Coubertin.
The 1896 Athens Games featured 241 athletes from 14 countries competing in 43 events
(Olympics, 2019). Subsequently, the Games were held in four-year increments, except
for 1940 and 1944 due World War II. The Winter Olympic Games were first held in 1924
in Chamonix, France with 258 athletes from 16 countries competing in 16 events.
Initially, the Winter Olympic Games were held the same year as the Summer Olympic
Games. However, since 1992, the Games have been on a four-year cycle for Summer and
Winter with an Olympic Event occurring every two years. The most recent Summer
Olympic Games hosted by Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2016 featured 11,238 athletes from
207 countries competing in 306 events, while the most recent Winter Olympic Games
were hosted by PyeongChang, South Korea in 2018 and featured 2,833 athletes from 92
countries competing in 102 events.
From its humble beginnings in the late 19th century, the Games have grown
immensely in number of countries and competitors participating. However, the growth in
participation and fan consumption has not been consistent. In the 1960s and 1970s, a
number of people believed the modern Olympics were too expensive and too scandal
ridden to be an attractive event to host. Problems involving displaced citizens in the 1968
Mexico City Summer Games (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2010), terrorist attacks
during the 1972 Munich Summer Games, Denver organizers backing out of the 1976
Winter Olympics, and the financial boondoggle that resulted from facility construction in
the 1976 Montreal Summer Games caused many pundits to believe the modern Olympic
games were not worth the huge trouble and expense needed to host. When the United
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States and a number of other “western” countries boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer
Games over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was concern among many that the
Olympic Games were on a downward trajectory (McBride, 2018; Walker 2014).
However, the negative perception of hosting largely changed after the 1984 Los Angeles
Summer Olympic Games.
The 1984 Summer Olympics did not initially appear to be moving the modern
Olympics in a positive direction. Very few viable cities even bothered to submit a bid and
Los Angeles in many ways was awarded the Games by default. However, the 1984 Los
Angeles Summer Olympic Games changed the Olympic movement, largely because local
taxpayers failed to pass legislation to subsidize the Games, which forced the organizers to
use existing infrastructure in order to reduce costs (Chalip, Green, Taks, & Misener,
2017). This lack of taxpayer support meant the chief organizer, Peter Ueberroth, and his
team had to find additional sources of funding. They were able to achieve this by being
cost conscious and focusing on private fundraising, selling broadcasting rights to ABC
for $225 million and extensively utilizing corporate sponsorships (Walker, 2014). While
sponsorship had been in use throughout the Olympics since Kodak was involved in the
1896 Games, the 1984 Games were considered the start of mass commercialization of the
Games as Ueberroth sold opportunities to sponsors across a variety of activities, many of
which had never before been sponsored (Stotlar & Nagel, 2017).
Following the 1984 Games and the perceived success of the organizers in
attracting sponsors who realized positive returns on investments and objectives, the IOC
introduced its Olympic Partners Program (TOP) to create long-standing, mutually
beneficial relationships with their top corporate partners (IOC, 2019). Since the inaugural
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1896 Games, the IOC had partnered with corporate supporters (including Kodak) by
selling advertisements to generate revenue (IOC, 2019). Ten companies had purchased
official rights for photographs and memorabilia for the 1912 Games in Sweden, and later
Olympic Games saw the rise of posters, corporate advertisements in the official program,
official concessionaires (Coca-Cola in 1928), as well as international marketing and
technical support. The initial advertisements tended to be simple with fully evolved,
multi-tiered partnerships not becoming commonplace until after the success of the 1984
Los Angeles Games. The organizers emphasized fewer sponsors, but at a higher
sponsorship cost, which, at the time, was unique. Afterwards, this was adopted by the
IOC and the implementation of the TOP program would revolutionize the entire sport
sponsorship industry.
The TOP program created exceptional benefits to the few official sponsors
investing at the initial level. Companies such as Coca-Cola, Panasonic and Visa (who
have remained sponsors throughout all the TOP cycles) were offered substantial benefits
not only at Olympic venues during the Games, but also opportunities to leverage their
relationship between the quadrennial competitions. TOP sponsorships offered partners
exclusive global marketing rights and opportunities within the sponsor’s business
category, as well as the rights to utilize IOC licensing, logos and partnerships with each
country’s national organizing committee (NOC) and the local Organizing Committee for
the Olympic Games (OCOG). The initial nine partners in TOP I paid a combined $96
million for these rights in 1985 (IOC, 2019). TOP VIII from 2013-2016 had 12 corporate
partners pay a combined $1.003 billion for exclusive marketing rights (IOC, 2019).
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Most recently TOP IX includes 13 international companies with all the partners
from TOP VIII renewing, with the exception of McDonalds (Table 2.1). In addition, two
new companies, Alibaba and Toyota have joined the TOP list. Sponsorship cost for the
companies in TOP IX was estimated to be a base of $200 million for 2017-2020, with
Alibaba reportedly paying $800 million for six Games over 12 years and Toyota
spending a record $835 million for four games from 2017-2024 (Boudway, 2017). With
such a large direct contribution for sponsorship, companies are expecting a high return in
order to justify their investment.
Table 2.1. Olympic TOP Sponsor Evolution
Cycle
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Years
1985-88
1989-1992
1993-1996
1997-2000
2001-2004
2005-2008
2009-2012
2013-2016

Number of
Sponsors

9
12
10
11
11
12
11
12

Total Revenue
(millions USD)
96
172
279
579
663
866
950
1,003

Once a company pays for a sponsorship, they then have to leverage the
sponsorship to maximize their investment return (Cornwell, 2008). The worldwide
broadcast viewership for the 2016 Rio Summer Olympic Games was estimated to exceed
3.5 Billion (Roxborough, 2016). It is clear that both the Olympic Games and World Cup
are likely to remain among the most important worldwide sporting events in the
foreseeable future. NBCUniversal paid $7.65 Billion to extend their current Olympic
broadcasting contract from 2020 through 2032 (IOC, 2014). To generate revenue to offset
their investment, NBCUniversal expects to be able to sell $1.2 billion in advertising for
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the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games (Tan, 2019) and will likely continue to increase
advertising prices for subsequent Games. For its part, FIFA sold the U.S. broadcasting
rights to the 2018 and 2022 World Cup to Fox for $425 million and to Telemundo for
Spanish language rights for $600 million. Globally, FIFA sold broadcasting rights for $3
billion for the 2015-2018 cycle, with an expected future cost exceeding $3.5 billion
(Badenhausen, 2018; Deitsch, 2015).
As the cost for sponsorship and broadcasting continue to increase, corporations
face a choice in managing their sponsorship portfolio and managing their business. With
increasing costs, it can put additional financial pressure on a company to successfully
integrate sponsorship into the business. One way that managers can evaluate performance
is to assess the change in their business stock price resulting from an announcement. If
the sponsorship announcement is viewed positively, then the company stock price will
rise as investors expect to achieve greater return resulting from the sponsorship.
Conversely, the opposite is true if a sponsorship is not viewed as a successful business
venture. This market reaction can serve as a signal for the managers about how corporate
sponsorship is perceived by investors. How quickly the market responds to new
information is termed the efficient market hypothesis.
2.2 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that markets react quickly to
information and that information is reflected in the share price of the firm (Fama, 1970).
In general, markets are considered to be efficient, and thus stock prices absorb, integrate
and reflect all available public information regarding the company (Coates &
Humphreys, 2008; Kim, 2010; Moyer, McGuigan & Rao, 2015). Therefore, the current
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share price is a reflection of the present value of all future expected cash flows and
earnings for the company (Myazaki & Morgan, 2001). When markets are composed of
buyers and sellers there exists potential differing perceptions regarding the value of the
stock resulting in opinion sometimes being confused with value (Stout, 2003). It can then
be understood that markets can be informationally efficient, where they reflect
information quickly, but not fundamentally efficient, where the price is an accurate
assessment based on the fundamentals (Stout, 2003). Publicly traded companies routinely
release business performance information relating to sales, earnings, cash flow, dividends
and business outlook that investors utilize in business evaluation. This release of business
performance can cause a market response as investors react to this information (Fama,
1991).
If markets are priced efficiently, then what should move the price is new,
pertinent information. With efficient markets it is possible to evaluate stock price change
in response to a specified event, as the event would indicate new information (Coates &
Humphreys, 2008). The utilization of an event study is then a suitable method for
assessing how quickly new information is incorporated into the price and whether it is
sustained at a new level, or fluctuates (Fama, 1991). Rather than view markets as a
rational test of equilibrium, it should be understood that behavioral factors can, and
sometimes do, cause the market to react in irrational ways (Thaler, 2016).
Some evidence suggests that price movements and inefficiencies exist, however,
they seem to affect smaller, rather than larger, corporations (Chan, 2003). Other concerns
that impact the efficiency of markets involve the emotionality of the investors and their
reaction to positive and negative news with increased market volatility and trading

15

volume (Strycharz, Strauss & Trilling, 2018). There are two types of news that can affect
changes to stock price: normal and unusual, with unusual news causing large jumps in
response to their announcement (Maheu & McCurdy, 2004). Moreover, Tetlock (2007)
demonstrated that negative news, or media pessimism, causes an initial decrease in price
that is quickly reversed as the price reverts toward its fundamentals.
Sponsorship has become an accepted marketing strategy to increase awareness,
enhance brand image and generate financial returns with announcements often predating
any activation strategies, but serving as a signal to the marketplace. If a sponsorship is
viewed positively then the share price of the company should increase above the current
market price and its predicted (based upon fundamentals) value, thus providing an
abnormal return. If, on the contrary, the market does not place a value on the
sponsorship’s ability to generate future cash flow, then the expected stock movement
would be either neutral (zero) or negative in response to sponsorship (Leeds, Leeds &
Pistolet, 2007). The type of sponsorship announcement may also impact stock returns,
with evidence suggesting that new and termination announcements have no discernable
impact on stock returns, but that renewal announcements are viewed positively indicating
that past sponsorship activities were financially successful (Kruger & Goldman, 2014).
With an assumption of efficient markets it is possible to use daily stock movements to
measure consumer reaction to an event. If companies are able to effectively leverage their
Olympic sponsorship then these companies should see a stock return above their
benchmark (comparison) index and expected movement.

16

2.3 SHAREHOLDER THEORY
In his well-publicized 1970 New York Times article, Dr. Milton Friedman argued
that the social responsibility of a corporation was to make a profit and that the individual
shareholders could contribute to any organization or cause they desired. This concept
helped support the view that a corporation was a vehicle for long-term wealth creation of
the owners (shareholders). For publicly traded companies, the purpose of managerial
decisions is to maximize the return on the shareholders’ investment through increasing
the share price and, subsequently, the market value of the company (Joshi & Hanssens,
2010). This purpose is in line with contemporary financial management that executives
should work to enhance the value of the shareholders (Moyer, McGuigan, & Rao, 2015)
and adopt effective corporate governance policies to protect the interests of shareholders
(McEnally & Kim, 2012). Marketing strategies and advertising expenditures can be an
effective utilization of company resources as they achieve greater-than-expected returns
to the organization when effectively employed (Joshi & Hanssens, 2010).
A criticism of shareholder theory is that it can encourage and incentivize company
executives to focus on short-term earnings to increase share price at the expense of
making decisions that foster long-term financial growth (Nocera, 2012). To some, it is
also an oversimplification of the role of a business, which also includes providing jobs,
paying taxes, delivering quality goods and services, and being a good corporate citizen
(Nocera, 2012). However, when defined as the creation of long-term wealth through the
undertaking of all positive net present value projects, shareholder theory offers the best
understanding of the function of a business (Danielson, Heck, & Schaffer, 2008). The
criticisms, and difficulties, occur as a result of a principle-agent conflict, whereby
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shareholders appoint managers to work on their behalf, but instead, managers work in
their own self-interest and the assumption they work to maximize shareholder profits is
invalid (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
To align managers and shareholders, adopting adequate corporate governance
policies and offering appropriate management incentives is necessary for the shareholders
to help hold managers accountable (McEnally & Kim, 2012). Optimally, when viewed in
the long run, businesses make decisions and undertake projects that lead to increased
profitability for the benefit of both its shareholders and stakeholders (Danielson, Heck, &
Shaffer, 2008). The concern for stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, creditors,
etc.) is that the focus on the shareholder alone potentially rewards the corporation for
making decisions for short-term gain at the expense of long-term growth (Stout, 2013).
Effective companies are those that work to maximize the value to all stakeholders by
making decisions for long-term growth and profitability.
Businesses are constantly faced with the challenge to balance multiple stakeholder
groups in an effective manner that leads to continued performance and profitability.
Some companies may have the expertise and financial resources necessary to undertake
large, expensive, and elaborate sponsorship partnerships, while others may view such
sponsorship opportunities as too expensive. The latter types of companies may still wish
to appear to be involved and may make a strategic decision to purchase advertising or
undertake ambush marketing tactics for a lower cost in hopes of achieving a positive
return (Andrews, 2012). Both the option to become an official sponsor or to ambush may
actually be an effective way of achieving organizational goals. The effectiveness of a
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sponsor compared to an ambush marketer in regard to stock price changes has not been
empirically evaluated.
2.4 SPONSORSHIP EVALUATION
Since sponsorship hinges on mutual benefit for the sponsor and event, it is
underpinned by exchange theory, whereby both entities exchange resources (Crompton,
2004) in order to establish relationships and highlight the value added for both parties
(Cousens, Babiak & Bradish, 2006). The use of a spillover effect from an event to a
brand also exists, and is enhanced over time to the benefit of long-time sponsors of major
events, such as the Olympics (Filis & Spais, 2012). In order for companies to continue
their sponsorship, they would need to ensure that their expenditures are at least equal to
benefits achieved (Stotlar, 2004). In addition to the direct sponsorship costs, additional
activation costs are usually incurred by the organization as they market, advertise, and
highlight their product during the timeframe of a sponsored event (Clark, Cornwell &
Pruitt, 2002) which may understate the true cost of sponsorship. These additional costs
are to promote and enhance the awareness, recognition and image of the sponsoring
brand (Keller, 1993). Most companies understand the need to provide this additional, or
collateral support, to the base activities of a sponsorship. Companies attempt to link their
organization with the sport entity in order to reach their intended market (Cornwell,
1995). Capital can then be strategically employed to highlight the relationship between
the sponsor and the sport entity by purchasing advertising, hosting hospitality events and
placing signage.
One of the most straight forward ways some marketers measure their sponsorship
impact is by assessing sales by comparing the event time to a control period, or through
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tracking promotion and activation strategies done in conjunction with the event
(Cornwell & Maignan, 1998). Increased sales as a direct result of a sponsorship would
provide a good indication that the activity was financially sound. However, determining
specific sales increases can be difficult in a dynamic environment where a number of
marketing activities may affect consumer decision making. In addition, some
sponsorships are not implemented with short-term sales as the primary goal as there are
other benefits a sponsor may derive.
For a sponsorship to be effective the company has to know what they want to
achieve from their relationship with the sport entity at the beginning of the sponsorship
(Spanberg, 2008). For some, a globalized world provides an opportunity for the brand to
expand its audience and target a new demographic, or reach a new market (Stotlar, 2013).
Unfortunately, brands looking to create awareness are not always successful, since many
fans display difficulty in correctly identifying sponsors (Maxwell & Lough, 2009; Shani
& Sandler, 1998). For others, the sponsorship provides a way to sell merchandise or
engage with consumers at the event.
Rather than utilize sponsorship as a medium for exposure or increasing
awareness, brands may focus on increasing future sales through highlighting their product
or building a contact list (Stotlar & Nagel, 2017). The event provides the sponsoring
brand with an opportunity to highlight a product, engage with customers, gather
consumer information and contact fans after the event to follow up with additional
marketing messages. The sponsorship then becomes a medium for the brand to engage
directly with a customer, or potential customer, and provide an opportunity to make a sale
(Stotlar, 2013). As the trend continues toward individual-based marketing, the ability to
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interact with the consumer and identify their needs and wants is paramount toward
enhancing their understanding of the product and making a future sale (Noori, 2012). An
effective sponsorship can provide access to a targeted customer market for the brand to
build their customer relationship management system.
Furthermore, brands may engage in sponsorship in an effort to build an image of
the brand in association with the sport entity (Meenaghan, 2001). Brands look to attain an
image transfer from the popular sport entity to the brand. Such an image transfer exists in
situations where the brand and the sport entity are viewed similarly, and their relationship
is congruent or intuitive (Meenaghan, 2001), such as Mountain Dew’s sponsorship of the
X-Games (Stotlar & Nagel, 2017) and Adidas sponsorship of the New Zealand Rugby
Union All Blacks (Stotlar, 2013). However, sponsorship may be unsuccessful in instances
where a perception of mutual image fit is lacking (Meenaghan, 2001).
Sponsors often use their sport partnerships as a medium for entertaining clients
and fostering business-to-business relationships (Stotlar, 2013). Sport events offer unique
hospitality opportunities for sponsoring brands to further develop relationships with
stakeholders and potential partners. These may have the appearance of lavish expenditure
for a limited few and not be perceived well by stakeholders in instances where there is an
ongoing labor dispute, or after a recession if companies received tax payer financial
assistance (Crompton, 2015). In such instances, the company may continue to sponsor
and host clients, but forego the typical signage and identification. While this decision
may still fulfill the hospitality need, it likely is not beneficial for awareness, image or
exposure. On the other hand, while it may not be perceived as effective, some companies
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have used hospitality to increase indirect sales from clients or business partners that were
among the most successful for the brand (Jacobs, Jain, & Surana, 2014).
There exists many sponsorship motivations and objectives, but there also exists
many ways to evaluate them. Sponsorship effectiveness has been studied with a variety of
methods, but no sure fire “perfect” mechanism has been determined. Some have noted a
research gap between a sport entity and sponsor, lack of objectives prior to sponsoring,
decreased understanding of the sponsorship value and differences in brand needs for
sponsorship (“A Futile Search,” 2008). Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in
the use of analytics and advanced data analysis to determine sponsorship effectiveness.
Companies like GumGum Sports have started utilizing artificial intelligence (AI)
technology to track media exposure to improve valuation and performance for sponsors
and sport leagues (“Gum Gum Sports,” 2019). Research indicates that some element of
sponsorship success is rooted within congruence, or fit, between the sponsor and the sport
entity (Clark, Cornwell & Pruitt, 2009). Though this is often perceived as a company
offering a product or service having a direct tie to an event (such as a tire sponsor should
be a better fit for an automobile race than a company selling toothpaste), it instead
usually extends to the work the two entities conduct to create a partnership that “fits” in
the minds of consumers. Sponsorships are more effective if the partnership forms a
coherent image between the two entities that the consumer can identify and remember
(Clark, Cornwell & Pruitt, 2009). Sponsors with higher congruence create higher recall
rates among consumers than lower congruence companies (Weeks, Humphreys &
Cornwell, 2018).
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Researchers have also attempted to evaluate sponsorships of publicly traded
companies by using their stock price as a proxy for derived value. A company’s stock
return can be evaluated at the time of a sponsorship announcement to determine its effect
on the company stock (Schweitzer, 1989). If the marketplace positively values the
sponsorship there should be an increase in the returns that would be expected had the
sponsorship not taken place, or a decline in return if the market deems the sponsorship to
decrease the value of the sponsoring brand (Aaker & Jacobson, 1994). This method has
potential limitations, as it relies on the sponsor being publicly traded, and thus prices
being known. In addition, there must be a lack of ancillary actions or events that could
confound the assessment of the event’s stock price impact (Deitz, Evans & Hansen,
2012). Other positive or negative occurrences, or even just the presence of other
marketing activities, could impact the stock price of a company that is engaging in
sponsorship. A detailed section covering stock price change research is provided later in
the literature review.
Though there is not any definitive scholarly or practitioner research that clearly
evaluates the specific cost-benefit analysis of sport sponsorship, there is certainly
evidence that sponsorship, in many cases, provides positive benefits. The spending trend
in the 1990s and 2000s where sponsorship became a growing element of many
company’s marketing plans (Cornwell, 2008) has continued though sport sponsors have
often altered their choice of sport and/or event with which to partner (Jensen & Turner,
2018). The cost of official sponsorship to many events has also continued to increase,
causing it to potentially be cost-prohibitive for some companies. Regardless of cost, some
companies have chosen to forego official sponsorship of events and instead have sought
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to confuse the public by pretending to align their brand with the event through ambush
marketing activities. Regardless of whether a company chooses to be an official sponsor,
or engage in ambush marketing, mega events such as the Olympics and World Cup
continue to draw attention from businesses looking to partner with them.
2.5 AMBUSH MARKETING
Ambush marketing is an organization’s attempt to associate itself and create
congruence with an event without paying a sponsorship fee to the event owner
(Chadwick & Burton, 2011; Grady, McKelvey & Bernthal, 2009). The concern for
ambush marketing is what led to the creation of the term “official sponsor” to help
protect sponsoring companies from such ambushing tactics (Cornwell, Pruitt & Clark,
2005). “Direct (or “blatant”) ambush marketing occurs when a company or brand
assertively correlates itself with an event when it has not made official payments or
bought legal rights as the official sponsor” (Amezquita, 2016, pp. 11). Indirect (or
“subtle”) ambush marketing, on the other hand, consists in "adjusting the message to the
nature of the event in the manner which does not directly breach the rights of the
organizers or the sponsors of the event, but rather uses the event as a pretext for the
ambusher's own marketing purposes (Amezquita, 2016, pp. 11). For example, Nike’s
“Find your Greatness” advertisement release at the time of the opening ceremony in
London 2012 did not violate any IOC copyright protection, but was effective in gaining
viewership and undermining the official sponsor, Adidas (Nakamura, 2018).
When successful, the ambushing company will confuse and convince a segment
of the public that it was an official partner, thus devaluing the worth of the sponsoring
organization’s paid sponsorship (Chadwick & Burton, 2011; Seguin et al, 2005). This is
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often accomplished with a considerably lower marketing investment by the ambusher
than what is paid by the official sponsor (Nakamura, 2018). Though much of the early
sport sponsorship literature concerned ambushing and the Olympic Games (Seguin &
O’Reilly, 2008), it is a major concern for marketers who make a decision to partner with
any organization or event. In recent years, a number of prominent companies such as
Nike, Under Armour and Subway have been engaged in ambush tactics and a number of
companies such as McDonalds, Adidas and AT&T have noted their concern for their
official sponsorships being ambushed.
Ambush marketing at the Olympics became prominent during the 1984 Games
when Kodak purchased advertising airtime and devalued the association of the official
sponsor, Fuji (Epstein, 2014). Interestingly, Fuji became the official film sponsor for the
LA Olympic Games only after long-time Olympic sponsor Kodak decided not to
participate after engaging in several months of negotiations. Kodak did, however, sponsor
the U.S. Track and Field team and advertised heavily during the Games to undermine
Fuji (Shiver & Yoshihara, 1985). Famously, Nike’s strategy of sponsoring Olympic gold
medalist, Michael Johnson, in Atlanta 1996 and its center just outside the Olympic
village effectively ambushed Reebok, the official sponsor (Nakamura, 2018). More
recently, Nike and Under Armour have created online social media campaigns, including
their endorsement of Olympic athletes, to attract consumer attention.
All sponsored entities need to consider the needs of their sponsors and take steps
to eliminate, or at least significantly lessen, the impact of ambushers. Official sponsors
who feel their investment does not maximize results, especially if there are less expensive
and as effective alternatives, will likely not renew their sponsorship agreements. At a
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minimum, sponsors rely on event organizers to protect their sponsorships by granting
special rights to their partners and restricting access to attendees for non-sponsoring
brands (Blackshaw, 2011). However, in some situations, particularly in the case of
sponsor recognition, ambush marketers are still able to cause confusion among
consumers (Nakamura, 2018; Pitt et al., 2010; Shani & Sandler, 1998). There are other
mechanisms that events may need to implement beyond just controlling the inside of their
facility to protect their partners. After years of being ambushed to various levels of
success, in 1997, the IOC required host cities to secure all advertising space within the
city for the sole use of official sponsors (Amezquita, 2016). Other events have also taken
steps to protect their sponsor’s investment including FIFA protecting the World Cup by
licensing to sponsors and outlining what it considers as ambushing (Blakey, 2018).
Local, state, national and, in some cases, even international government entities
may be involved in helping to protect official sponsors from ambush tactics. The IOC has
relied on the Lanham Act in the United States and similar laws in other countries to
restrict the use of Olympic logos and phrases (Epstein, 2014). Events may rely on local
laws, sometimes passed to apply only during event periods, against posting signage in
front yards or on or around buildings that may be visible to event attendees. Some megaevents also seek to protect their sponsors through the use of cease and desist letters and
restrictions on athletes’ advertising for non-sponsoring brands, such as the IOC’s Rule 40
(Nakamura, 2018). In some cases, restrictions on athlete or fan behavior has run counter
to laws protecting freedom of speech (Stotlar & Nagel, 2017). In an era of increased
usage of tattoos and social media, bans on certain activities have been challenged in a
variety of legal settings. For example, during the last couple of Olympic cycles, a number
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of athletes complained that it was unjust for their social media accounts to be restricted
and for their bodies, beyond their uniform, to be controlled (Sherman, 2012). Partly in
reaction to these complaints and growing sentiment among consumers, the IOC has
recently loosened elements of Rule 40 so athletes will be allowed to publicize some of
their non-IOC or USOC sponsor relationships. In addition, non-official sponsors will
have greater freedom to participate in Olympic broadcast advertising (Taylor, 2016).
To guard against ambushers, sponsors also need to implement tactics to leverage
and activate their formal association so that they can fully engage with consumers
(Cornwell, 2008). It is certainly important to have assistance in protecting their
relationships, but sponsors ultimately have to convey their relationship in a strong enough
manner that accentuates the unique attributes of the sponsor relationship so that it is less
likely that consumers are confused. Effective sponsors typically build an entire
marketing campaign around their sponsorship relationship so that their consumers gain a
better understanding of the partnership.
Despite these efforts, some ambush marketers have demonstrated the ability to
devalue official sponsorship (Hill, 2016) and even be identified as a major sponsor, when
in fact, they are not (Schwabe, 2018). The Global Language Monitor index is used as a
brand awareness tool to examine the relationship between a brand and TOP sponsorship.
Recently, they issued a report following the 2016 Rio Olympic Games which indicated
that two of the top five, and 13 out of 20 brands on the index were ambush companies
and not official sponsors (Pavitt, 2016). This suggests that even with additional
investment to activate sponsorships, companies may not be able to achieve the results
regarding brand equity that they anticipate due to consumer confusion (Pitt, Parent,
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Berthon & Steyn, 2010). This becomes especially problematic for mega-events such as
the World Cup and the Olympic Games as the rapidly escalating costs to become and
remain an official sponsor necessitate that those sponsors maximize their benefits.
Within this marketplace, sponsorship managers are also faced with the difficult
paradox that while consumers indicate that they do not approve of ambush marketing,
they routinely demonstrate an inability to identify who the official sponsors are (Pitt,
Parent, Berthon & Steyn, 2010) and they often appear to not really care when it comes to
choosing products and services to consume when they receive marketing messages.
Further, even when they are legally and morally correct to complain about ambush
marketing tactics, large, multi-national TOP sponsors face the difficulty that a strong
backlash to ambushing may make them seem like they are whining (Pitt, Parent, Berthon,
& Steyn, 2010).
This lack of accurate identification creates an interesting environment where
consumers say that ambushing is wrong, but they are still swayed by their tactics. At the
same time, companies, both large and small, make decisions to potentially sponsor an
event or engage in ambush activities without knowing the impact those decisions may
have upon their stock price. For mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympics,
the large variety of potential sponsorship outcomes, and ambush opportunities, present a
fertile ground to study stock returns. In order to study such stock returns among the
largest and smallest sponsors as well as well-known ambushers, an event study
methodology must be utilized.
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2.6 EVENT STUDY METHODS
Event analysis is the evaluation of a company’s stock price reaction to news, or an
event, and was initially introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). The central
tenant in event study methods is the measurement of an abnormal stock return in response
to the specified event (MacKinlay, 1997). Proper analysis of the impact of the event on
company stock return is composed of five parts outlined by Bowman (1983): 1. Identify
the event, 2. Model the security price reaction, 3. Estimate the excess returns, 4. Organize
and group the excess returns, and 5. Analyze the results.
An event study methodology is characterized by comparing the actual rate of
return of the firm to what would have happened had the event not occurred (MacKinlay,
1997). Initially, a baseline model is created in advance to the event being studied to have
a means of comparison and to enhance the effect of unexpected news (Brown & Warner,
1985). The baseline model is generally either a means-adjusted model or a market model
based on the regression of the stock to an appropriately identified benchmark (Bowman,
1983). According to MacKinlay (1997), the pre-event window should be approximately
250 trading days prior to the identified event window.
Other assumptions in the use of event studies are that the event in question is
unexpected and that there does not exist the appearance of confounding factors that may
result in inaccurate benchmarking (Brown & Warner, 1985). The existence of
confounding occurrences around the event in question also has the potential to change the
results (Brown & Warner, 1985; Deitz, Evans & Hansen, 2012). Once a baseline is
constructed, the calculation of abnormal returns is performed (Fama, 1998). A positive
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coefficient would indicate that investors reacted positively to the news while a negative
coefficient would indicate a more pessimistic outlook (Fama, 1998).
The benchmark return regresses the daily stock return of the company of interest
to the appropriate benchmark, such as the S & P 500 or the University of Chicago Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value weighted index for large capitalization US
stocks (MacKinlay, 1997). Once the event day is determined, the event window extends
from several days before the event to several days after the event in order to determine
any change that happens from the leaking of information, and to provide time for the
market to respond to the event and process abnormal returns over a period of time.
Typically, a 20-day pre-event window and 20-day post-event window is utilized
(MacKinlay, 1997). The event window can be further isolated for specific assessment of
cumulative returns over shorter time periods. The cumulative returns over this specified
holding period ascertain whether movements are short term and quickly return to their
baseline or rather cause a longer duration change of appreciation in value (MacKinlay,
1997).
In order to examine rate of returns in response to an event, a regression model is
utilized based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or simply termed market model
(Brown & Warner, 1985). The utilization of this method allows for the creation of a
benchmark based on the past performance of the company and its appropriate index. This
then provides a means of comparing the company rate of return to its benchmark and
whether an excess is achieved, where it would not normally be expected to.
The model for the calculation of returns using the market approach is constructed
as follows (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997):
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Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit
Where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, αi and βi are constants in the model and
εit is the residual. Then, the abnormal return of the stock on day 1 would be equal to the
residual or,
Εit = Rit – αi - βiRmt
Where E is the abnormal return obtained by subtracting the actual return R by the
constants (α and β) of the regression model for the market return. While the market
model is the most common, it is possible to use multifactor models that include index
returns, or a more simplistic means model for comparison, with the results from all being
similar to each other (MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, the two-phase market model is the most
consistently employed (phase 1 predicts the model, phase 2 calculates the abnormal stock
return). Once the daily abnormal returns have been calculated, the cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) can be assessed, which is the summation of the daily abnormal returns for
the specified time period:
CARi(t1,t2) = ∑ ARit
With multiple securities being tested, the average of each abnormal return and cumulative
abnormal return is the simple mean of the daily return for each firm divided by the
number of firms in the sample.
In an effort to more fully capture the expected return of a stock, Fama and French
(1993) created a three factor model to estimate returns based on the market, size of the
company and its value as specified by book-to-price. This model is represented as:
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Rit – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + SiSMBt + HiHMLt + εit
Where Rit is the return of the company and Rft is the risk free rate, Rmt is the return
of the market portfolio, SMBt is the return of small stocks minus the return of large
stocks, HMLt is the difference between the return for high and low book-to-market ratios
and εit is the residual. This model helps to explain that smaller companies (by market
capitalization) have higher expected returns as do companies with lower book-to-market
ratios (so termed value stocks). This was further adjusted by Carhart to incorporate a
stock’s momentum into the estimation (1997), as well as its profitability (Fama & French,
2015). In the estimation for a firm’s return over time, the inclusion of additional variables
seems to capture the realized return, on average. However, despite the additional
variables in the estimation, it does not improve upon the market model for event studies
(Binder, 1998).
Statistical tests for the interpretation of the abnormal returns is a parametric t
statistic for the observed return compared to the expected return (Bowman, 1983).
However, there have been some concerns for inference including non-normality of
returns and the potential for serial correlation of the observations which may cause an
upward bias in the test statistic (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1985). Despite these
concerns, it has been shown that using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model results in
the use of a t statistic that is well specified (Bowman, 2006; MacKinlay, 1997). In spite
of this, researchers have used non-parametric tests (bootstrapping) and Corrado Z tests to
correct for a potential bias (Mazodier & Rezaee, 2013).
It has been argued that the use of non-parametric tests may be a more appropriate
measure of returns given the potential violation of a normal distribution. Corrado (1989)
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proposed a rank test for single-day event windows, however, many event windows are
longer than one day (Cowan, 1992). Cowan (1992) recommends a generalized sign test
where the test statistic is the fraction of having a positive abnormal return in the event
window given the fraction of positive abnormal returns during a 100-day estimation
period where s is dummy coded for 1 as a positive abnormal return and 0 otherwise:
p=1/n∑1/100∑sjt
The sign test is then a z score given the number of firms that have a positive cumulative
abnormal return during the event window (w), expressed as:
Zg=w-np/[np(1-p)]1/2
The Corrado rank test utilizes the same 100-day estimation window and an 11-day event
window providing a rank for the returns observed in each day 1-111, with a 1 signifying
the smallest abnormal return and 111 the largest, which results in a mean of 56 ranging
from day D1 to day Dd. The test statistic is then:
ZR=d1/2*Kd-56/[∑(Kt-56)2/111]1/2
Where Kd is the average rank of the n stocks and d days in the event window and Kt is the
average rank of the n stocks on day t of the 100-day estimation window.
For shorter event windows, a rank test performs better, but as the length of the
window increases, the generalized sign test is a better fit since it tests the cumulative
abnormal return window as a whole, rather than individual days (Cowan, 1992). A
second limitation of the rank test is that during an event window the variance of returns
increases (Brown & Warner, 1985), which directly impacts the rank of returns and results
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in less accurate interpretation. As events cluster (occur at the same time) the correlation
amongst the companies in the sample increases, resulting in inaccuracy of the test
statistics commonly utilized, both parametric and non-parametric (Kolari & Pynnonen,
2011). For this reason, it may be more appropriate to utilize a seemingly unrelated
regression model (SUR) for event clusters which accounts for this correlation (Binder,
1998).
Another option is to use a derivation of the market approach, but construct a
model that utilizes dummy variables for the assessment of individual days, and a
summation for CAR (Leeds, 2010). This model allows for the analysis of the event in one
model, as opposed to the two-step market model, as well as has less restrictive
assumptions (Leeds & Leeds, 2012). The procedure is similar to a market model with the
addition of dummy variables where the model is constructed compared to a relevant
baseline for at least 170 days prior to the event (Leeds & Leeds, 2012). Utilizing this
model, the abnormal daily returns are calculated by:
Ri,t = βi0 + βi1Rm t + δsDs + εi,t
Where R is the return of firm i at time t, β0 is the OLS intercept of the model,
βRmt is the OLS coefficient for the market return, D is the dummy variable for the event
day equal to 1 for that day and 0 otherwise, δ as the coefficient for the event day, or
excess return, and ε is the residual error in the model.
To calculate the CAR, a summation is included into the model for the dummy
variables for the dates to be included in the specified holding period (Leeds & Leeds,
2010):
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Ri,t = βi0 + βi1 Rmt + ∑ δsDs + εi,t
While this model incorporates the use of a dummy variable into one equation, the effect
is that the utilization of the t statistic is equivalent to other models without the same
restrictive assumptions of uncorrelated errors, as the analysis relies on the covariance
matrix (Leeds & Leeds, 2010).
This method has two other attractive features, the first being that the sigmas
(regression estimated returns) from the model can subsequently be used as a dependent
variable in a cross sectional regression model for analysis of firm-specific characteristics
on returns, and the second is that the model is easily incorporated with use of SUR
(Karafiath, 1988). Despite these appealing features for utilization in SUR there appears to
have been few researchers who have adopted this method in the sport management
context.
For firms of interest, utilizing a broad market is the usual method (Brown &
Warner, 1985; Leeds & Leeds, 2012), but for countries, and economies, of interest, the
market may not be an appropriate benchmark because the index itself is the market of
interest. In order to test the impact of an event on a country wide economy, that country’s
index can be used for study and can be regressed on either a larger, international market,
or a lagged return of its past performance, known as autoregression (Leeds & Leeds,
2012). An autoregressive model is specified as (Berman, Brooks, & Davidson, 2000;
Leeds & Leeds, 2012):
Rt = β0 + β1Rt-1 + δsDs + εt
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Where Rt is the index return, Rt-1 is the lagged return of the index, δs is the
coefficient for the estimated return on day s, Ds is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the
day s and 0 otherwise and ε is the residual. For assessment of a longer event window a
summation is included to sum the sigmas of all the days in the window (Leeds & Leeds,
2012).
While they are popular in the literature, the use of autoregressive techniques in
stock return modeling has been questioned since the interpretation of the regression is
more difficult. It is also suggested that the use of the model does not adequately capture
trends or cyclic changes in returns that may lead to erroneous interpretations (Harvey,
1997). Past returns are also considered noisy measures of expected returns and once an
event occurs, there is a tendency to observe an increase in the variability of stock returns
as a result (Fama, 1991). One adjustment that has been made is to include not just a
lagged time for the event, but a lead, future date as well, to account for increase in
variability (Edmans et al, 2007; Wang & Markellos, 2018).
Some studies use the market model to predict returns and then use the residuals in
this model for a dependent variable to analyze the independent variables in question over
time (Edmans, Garcia, & Norli, 2007). Since the returns of these time series models do
not follow a normal distribution and demonstrate increased variability (Hamilton &
Susmel, 1994), the use of a Generalized Autoregressive for Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to address the skewness of these returns
through time (Floros, 2010). The utilization of this model has shown that variation of
skewness in the distribution through time can be seen as heteroscedasticity and the
utilization of a GARCH model is a better predictor of returns in a time-series analysis
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(Harvey & Siddique, 1999). An advantage of the GARCH procedure with modeling time
series returns is that the use of dummy variables creates a parsimonious model, the
variability of event clustering is accounted for, as is heteroskedasticity of the returns
(Filis & Spais, 2012). The general model for evaluation is:
yit = μ + β1yi.t-1 + β2Di + β3Dii + εit
σit2 = ω + β4ε2i,t-1 + β5σ2i,t-1 + β6Di + β7Dii + uit
Where yit corresponds to stocki's daily returns and σ2it corresponds to stocki’s conditional
variance. The first equation is the mean (μ) return of stocki for the study period of the
dummy variables (Di and Dii) and an error term (εi,t). The second equation models the
variance (σ2) with a constant (ω), the lag of the squared residual from the first equation,
the dummy variables (Di and Dii), and the error term uit. The first dummy variable Di
takes value zero for the pre-event period and one for the post-event period. The second
dummy variable Dii takes one for the event window and zero elsewhere. The use of
dummy variables allows for the assessment of a change in response to the event window
specified. If the coefficient of the effect of the dummy variable is positive, it signifies that
there is a positive effect in response to the specified event window.
While an ordinary least squares (OLS) model fit is acceptable method in event
studies, and will have similar results as other methods, there are times when allowing for
correlation of the error term improves the interpretability in the model. One such time is
when events occur in multiple firms at the same time, in which case there will be
correlation in the error in the predicted return that is similar across all the firms (Binder,
1998). In this case, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model can improve the
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accuracy of the estimation (Tanuwidjaja, 2007). SUR’s main contribution is to allow for
assessment of events that affect several firms, and each firm’s reaction to that event
(Binder, 1985).
When events are contemporaneous (occur in the same time), the utilization of
dummy variables provides the same numerical estimates as a two-step event study
method (Karafiath, 1988). It also allows for the utilization of the dummy variables to
assess the average returns of a number of firms that are subject to the same event window
that result in smaller standard errors (Salinger, 1992). While initially used to test the
effect of regulatory changes on companies within a specific sector, a multivariate model
is useful for examining the returns of several companies who have the same event
timeline (Binder, 1998). The usefulness of a single model is that it adjusts for
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity involving the firms. The model is the
same as the OLS market model, but exists in a stacked form for each company in the
event window, as follows:
R1,t = β10 + β11 Rmt + ∑ δ1sDs + ε1,t
R2,t = β20 + β21 Rmt + ∑ δ2sDs + ε2,t
…

Rn,t = βn0 + βn1 Rmt + ∑ δnsDs + εn,t
Where each firm contains the same, or similar, independent variables, but the
coefficients adjust based on the firm (Binder, 1998). In addition to handling
contemporaneous correlation, the series of equations also allows the error across the
sample to have different variances. This increase in efficiency is especially useful if the
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independent variables differ for the equations (Zellner, 1962). Not only is this stacked
equation more efficient than performing single assessments for each company in the
sample, but the variances are much smaller than those found in single equation estimates
(Zellner, 1962). An additional feature of the SUR is that the test statistics are not as
sensitive to violations of the assumption of normality, and when combined with
bootstrapping can provide more accurate confidence intervals (Rilstone & Veall, 1996).
Despite these advantages and the prevalence of event clustering, especially in the sport
context, this method has seen limited utilization.
If companies indeed exist for the creation of wealth for their shareholders, then
understanding how decisions impact the performance of their stock is important. Event
studies have been conducted for the last 50 years in a variety of corporate settings to
better understand stock performance. For all versions of an event study, a baseline is
necessary in order to evaluate expected compared to unexpected performance (Brown &
Warner, 1985). Commonly, this baseline is created by using a market model where the
rate of return for the firm is regressed against the appropriate benchmark (S&P 500 for
large cap U.S. stocks). Once this baseline is established, the actual returns are then
compared to the expected returns for assessment of abnormal response. A simpler
approach is to use dummy variables to identify the event window in question and assess
the coefficients directly. For companies that share the same event window, a multivariate
model can be conducted that allows for the correlation of the error terms, but for
individual examination of the event in question. As sport has established event days and
competition amongst firms for consumers, this method is an appropriate, but
underutilized, means of assessment.
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2.7 RATIONALE FOR HOSTING MEGA-EVENTS
Bidding to host a mega-event is an expensive undertaking and the subsequent
decision by the organizing body to choose a host city is often a highly anticipated event.
Host cities bid, in part, due to the belief that hosting a mega-event will spur investment
and economic growth resulting from the event (Liu, 2011). Many countries view megaevent hosting as an opportunity to demonstrate their political and economic advancement
to the world (Tomlinson, Bass, & Bassett, 2011). Their successful hosting of an event on
the scale of the Olympic Games or World Cup serves as a signal of their increased
stature. The addition of the international broadcast viewership provides further
opportunity for the country to demonstrate their ascension among the world’s leaders
(Maharaj, 2015). In order to fulfill the desire to host an event on the world stage, some
countries move ahead with a bid without input from the taxpayers or their approval for
the allocation of taxpayer funds for construction costs and other expenses (Zimbalist,
2015).
The rationale for the construction is that the mega-event provides the host
community with the opportunity to invest in their infrastructure. This trend for
infrastructure development as a part of mega-event hosting started with the 1960 Summer
Olympic Games in Rome, Italy, and has continued to increase the cost of development
(Liao & Pitts, 2006). For many host communities, the influx of visitors to the Games
creates demand for adequate housing, transportation and venues during the event, but
after the event, supply far exceeds the future demand, as there are rarely permanent
residents for venues and Olympic housing is usually not successfully converted to
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residential housing (Newman, 2007). The benefits occur to the construction companies,
who capitalize on the cost of development (Zimbalist, 2015).
In a culmination of the infrastructure development of the 1960’s and 1970’s,
Denver became the first host city chosen to cancel its hosting after taxpayers refused to
authorize additional spending in 1972. Then, after the 1976 Summer Olympic Games,
Montreal’s Olympic Stadium ended up costing taxpayers over $1 billion and was not
completely paid off until 30 years after the hosting of the Games (McBride, 2018). The
concern over the cost of hosting the Olympics and the public debt that resulted initially
led taxpayers to be wary of hosting in the lead up to the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in
Los Angeles, California. However, due to the savvy business decisions of the organizers
in response to this limited taxpayer funding, those Olympics were widely considered
profitable and a model for future host cities (Wharton, 2016), which provided future hostcommunities with the rationale necessary for bidding.
The financial burden of hosting a mega-event has seen continued growth over
time (Baade & Matheson, 2016) as well as a consistent pattern of cost-overruns that
places additional burden on the taxpayers (Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Stewart, 2016). Despite
the escalating costs that have dramatically outpaced inflation, host countries continue to
bid, in part, for the potential they see for investment in infrastructure and tourism with the
perception it will lead to future economic growth (Baade & Matheson, 2016; Tomlinson,
Bass, & Bassett, 2011). In addition to the pre-event costs associated with hosting a megaevent, additional challenges are presented to many host countries because of large sport
complexes built specifically for a mega-event that are dormant after the conclusion of the
event (Robinson & Torvik, 2005). These “white elephants” can drain financial resources

41

for maintenance after the event has concluded and can also become dilapidated.
Additional costs for a successful bid to host a mega event can involve staffing concerns
for security (Tomlinson, Bass, & Bassett, 2011) and dealing with protesters who may
view hosting as supporting large financially stable institutions rather than providing
economic benefit that positively benefits all demographic groups within the host country
(Maharaj, 2015). As an example, in order to pay for police during the 2016 Summer
Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro received $900 million from the federal government
(McBride, 2018).
Once the hosting of a mega-event has occurred, it is possible to ascertain the
impact that hosting had on the economy both during and after the event. While touted as
a mechanism to create jobs, mega-events often result in a short-term increase of part-time
jobs, rather than sustained employment. Anticipated tourism increases also sometimes
fail to materialize, as concerns of crime, crowding and prices can dissuade would-be
travelers from visiting (McBride, 2018). Then, there is the debt that taxpayers incur as a
direct result of the infrastructure and stadium developments and their ongoing
maintenance (Mitrofanova, Russkova, Batmanova, & Shkarupa, 2015). Prior to hosting,
however, the allure of hosting a mega-event may be viewed by the marketplace as being a
positive event. If investors view the potential hosting as a signal of future economic
growth, they may invest in the businesses and industries that they think are likely to
benefit. Collectively, these investment decisions may indicate an expectation of future
returns for the countries and businesses that are involved with the mega-event.
Event studies have been extensively utilized in sport to examine, amongst other
things, a country’s stock market index in response to hosting a mega-event such as the
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Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup (Floros, 2010; Leeds, Mirikitani, & Tang, 2009),
investor response to initial sponsorship announcements (Hundt & Horsch, 2019; Lee &
Groves, 2012), athlete endorsements (Ding, Molchanov, & Stork, 2011; Hood, 2012),
naming rights announcements (Leeds, Leeds, & Pistolet, 2007), jersey sponsorship
reaction during events (Hanke & Kirchler, 2013) and investor sentiment for on-field
performance (Edmans, Garcia, & Norli, 2007; Ehrmann & Jansen, 2015). Its utilization to
investigate non-sponsors has seen limited use (Hino & Takeda, 2019) and the
examination of company stock performance in response to a sponsored event has not
been compared to a non-sponsor’s performance. The following three sections detail the
negative effects of sporting events, highlight research that has been done in the areas of
stock returns, sponsorship, hosting mega events and overall stock market volatility.
2.8 NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF SPORT MEGA-EVENTS
Part of the rationale for cities and countries to bid on hosting a mega-event is the
belief that hosting will exert a net-positive effect on the economy of the city or country in
question (Barclay, 2009). However, in actuality, this has not been achieved (Siegfried &
Zimbalist, 2006). Another common rationale is the increase in tourism that occurs as the
result of the mega-event, however this may come at the expense of other visitors
(Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2006). The announcement of a mega-event hosting
announcement can have an anticipatory effect on the location that can increase
investment within that community (Preuss, 2006). There has been some support that the
announcement of a world cup increases the stock return of the tourism sector (Nicolau,
2012), however this is temporary, as in the long term there is a trend for hotels
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constructed for mega-events to go out of business from the lack of tourism (Baade &
Matheson, 2016).
There is also ongoing concern that the hosting of mega-events entails large
opportunity costs and enhances gentrification. Moreover, in the case of Rio de Janeiro,
there were two conflicting branding messages that afflicted the hosting of mega-event; on
the one hand were the entrepreneurs and governing officials who were portraying the
events as a way to regenerate the city, and on the other hand were social actors discussing
human rights and fulfillment of social needs (Maiello & Pasquinelli, 2015). While the
hosting of an event can serve as a vehicle to communicate to a target audience to
highlight a location, it is also difficult to control all the messaging surrounding the event
(Preuss, 2009).
In order to determine the efficiency of hosting an event it is necessary to ascertain
the collective benefit of hosting the events on each stakeholder and the costs necessary of
hosting. This assessment also varies as the more investment made for events make future
events more efficient as the initial infrastructure has been developed (Preuss, 2009).
Unfortunately, many hosts fail to adequately plan for the impact of an event on a longer
term strategy. Many times, financial resources are allocated to the short term
development and operations of the event, at the expense of a longer term outcome (Jago,
et al., 2010). Therefore, any increase in anticipated future growth fails to materialize and
the initial money spent is not recouped.
For fans to attend sporting events they have to travel to the event in question.
Driving to an event increases the vehicle miles driven for the population, which increases
emissions and road wear and decreases traffic flow (Humphreys & Pyun, 2017). When
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analyzing the air quality surrounding Major League Baseball games, Locke (2018) found
that baseball game decreased the air quality by 0.65%. Air quality concerns are not just
present in the attendance of the event, but also the construction of the facilities, when
particulate matter in the air is increased (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2018). Despite the
presence of pollution during matches in the Chinese Soccer League, fans did not alter
their consumption habits, although there exists long term health effects from exposure
(Watanabe, Yan, Soebbing, & Fu, 2019). For mega-events is the added impact of athletes
and fans traveling to competition destination, where the largest environmental impact is
event-related travel (Collins, Jones & Munday, 2009). As a result, it has been argued that
sporting events cause negative externalities within the local area, including traffic,
pollution, crime and poor health outcomes that would be taxed in other contexts
(Humphreys, 2019).
2.9 SPONSORSHIP AND COMPANY STOCK RETURN
As sponsorship agreements have become more lucrative and complex, the need to
properly evaluate their impact has increased. However, estimating the performance of an
event sponsorship is made difficult by the fact that companies do not typically disclose
the contractual details of the partnership agreement, including the internal decision
making and financial management process (Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001). This lack of
disclosure has led researchers to adopt alternative methods for evaluating sponsorship
effect which include the company stock return as a result of the sponsorship
announcement. Such investigations have spanned a variety of sport teams, events and
venues. For example, in their analysis of the value of naming rights for stadiums, Leeds,
Leeds and Pistolet (2007) found little evidence that the purchase of naming rights had an
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impact on sponsor stock returns. In some cases, there was a small increase the day or two
after the announcement that subsequently decreased, leading to a neutral overall stock
response (Leeds, et al, 2007).
Following their examination of stock price response to international sport
sponsorship, Mazodier and Rezaee (2013) concluded that such sponsorship had a
negative impact on share value, which was especially true for United States’ based
companies indicating that the perceptions of the shareholders was that the sponsorship
would not positively reflect back to the brand. While studying international soccer
matches on the stock return of athlete jersey sponsors, game losses indicated a negative
stock return for the sponsors which was more pronounced if the defeat was a knockout
(elimination game) or was unexpected (Hanke & Kirchler, 2013). This seemingly created
an association between a company and the emotionality of the fans.
Conversely, other researchers have found that positive stock returns were realized
resulting from their sponsorship (Clark, Cornwell & Pruitt, 2002; Cornwell, Pruitt &
Clark, 2005; Mishra, Bobinski & Bhabra, 1997). In an analysis of sponsorship for the
Super Bowl, it was found that there were no unusual stock returns for individual days,
however, longer holding periods including an event window two days prior to two days
post [-2,2], three days prior to three days post [-3,3] and four days prior to four days post
[-4,4] were found to be positive (Eastman, Bradley & Wiggenhorn, 2010). Clark et al.
(2009) demonstrated a decrease in market value for sponsorship of NCAA bowl games
and a professional tennis tournament; however, mixed outcomes were observed for PGA
sponsorship (Kim, 2010). There appears to be consistency in findings that NASCAR
achieves a positive stock price outcome for sponsorship announcement (Clark, et al,
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2009; Pruitt, Cornwell & Clark, 2004). To determine sport sponsorship outcomes on
firms in Japan between 1991 and 2014, Hino and Takeda (2019) utilized a three-factor
model to identify abnormal stock returns, which were then used to build a multiple
regression model. The results indicate that sponsors in Japan had a positive market
reaction while their competitors had a negative market reaction that could be the result of
a signal regarding the expected success of the sponsoring company in attracting new
customers. The positive market results decreased over the years, potentially the result of
the rising cost of sport sponsorship, which may indicate the public views sponsorship as a
poor investment. This finding was echoed by another evaluation of 98 official sport
sponsorship announcements over 10 years that found that while the announcement
demonstrated a positive response for the Summer Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup, and
UEFA European Soccer Championship, it decreased over time (Abril, Sanchez & Recio,
2018).
In further examination of stock price adjustments to sponsorship announcements,
researchers concluded that returns are dependent on the firm, the event being sponsored
and the congruence of the firm with the event (Clark, Cornwell & Pruitt, 2009).
Companies that have greater return on assets, and thus a demonstrated history of driving
returns to the firm, achieve greater returns than those with lower selected financial ratios
(Clark et al., 2002; Mishra, Bobinski & Bhabra, 1997). In addition to return on assets,
being identified as a technology company and firm size play a role, with larger
companies, as measured by market capitalization, expected to generate greater returns
(Clark et al., 2002). Returns also vary by region, as well as by sport with soccer not
showing much impact, but NASCAR demonstrating positive responses. However, the
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positive stock responses identified appear to be more pronounced for smaller firms with a
brand transfer on a national rather than international level with Asia/Pacific companies
demonstrating greater positive responses (Reiser, Breuer, & Wicker, 2012). The lack of
uniformity regarding positive sponsorship response to announcements continues to
contribute to ongoing academic interest in this area.
Some companies have additional sponsorship opportunities open to them on a
global scale. Olympic sponsorship is unique in the sport realm due to its size, commercial
success, seasonal rotation and ability to generate substantial revenues through
sponsorship (Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001). Indeed, a recent report issued by the IOC lists
revenue from sponsorship as the second highest contributor to the organization at 45%.
This is slightly behind broadcasting rights contributions of 47% (IOC, 2018). Since
Olympic sponsorship is an expensive investment for the sponsoring firms, it has garnered
academic interest to identify whether such investment produces positive results.
Following the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Miyazaki and Morgan (2001) examined
the change in stock price resulting from sponsorship announcement and did not identify
any significant negative abnormal stock returns. There was one significant positive return
which led the authors to conclude that Olympic sponsorship may have positive value to
the sponsoring firms, or at least, be seen to sell at market price with a zero expected
future return. These findings are supported by those of Samitas, Kenourgios and Zounis
(2008) who reviewed the sponsorship announcement regarding the 2004 Athens Games
and concluded that sponsoring firms did achieve positive abnormal stock returns, which
were more pronounced for smaller, national companies compared to larger, international
sponsors. The announcement of sponsorships for the London 2012 Olympic Games
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demonstrated greater returns for TOP sponsors over official sponsors and for national
British brands over non-British brands, as well as increased trading activity (Baim,
Goukasian, & Misch, 2015).
Contrary to these findings, researchers using a regression model with dummy
variables and bootstrapping failed to identify any abnormal returns in response to the
announcement of the national team sponsors for the 2004 Olympics (Tsiotsou &
Lalountas, 2005). A similar finding was discovered by Deitz, Evans and Hansen’s (2012)
results indicating a significant negative return for firms that sponsor the Olympics. This
finding was based on the change in market price at the time the announcement was made,
with TOP sponsors showing more of a negative return than other sponsorship levels. This
conclusion supports a previous finding that Olympic sponsorship announcements have a
negative effect on the share price of the firm (Farrell & Frame, 1997). The evidence
regarding investor reaction to sponsorship announcements for the Olympics has thus far
proven inconclusive.
TOP sponsors invest the greatest amount of money on Olympic sponsorships, so
it is likely those companies would demand a higher return on that investment during and
after the Games. Researchers confirmed that the Beijing 2008 Olympic sponsors slightly
outperformed the S&P 500 over the course of the Games (Kim, Jung & Lee, 2013), with
some days during the event window being abnormal, but the absence of a cross sectional
evaluation does not illuminate the reasons why this was observed. It could be that
abnormal returns were seen during the Olympics that may relate to activation strategies,
broadcasting viewership or other unidentified variables. In an assessment of the
announcement of 21 sponsoring companies of different levels (TOP, Grand National,
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Official sponsor, exclusive supplier) for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, no effect on
firm value was noticed. Moreover, reaction to firm value surrounding the opening
ceremony differed between international and domestic firms, with domestic companies
demonstrating a negative reaction while international companies showed a positive
reaction. Conjecture exists regarding different motives, marketing and activation
strategies between firms being the potential cause of the difference (Molchanov, Stork, &
Zeng, 2010).
There were 117 advertisers identified for the Summer Olympic Games in 2000,
2004 and 2008. Overall, they achieved an increase in share price from the Monday before
the Games to the Friday after the Games compared to the S&P 500 over the same period
(Tomkovick & Yelkur, 2010). Subsequently, the researchers compared the performance
of sponsorship companies versus advertising (but not sponsoring) companies and
concluded that sponsoring companies who augment their sponsorship with advertising
achieve greater-than-expected changes to their stock price (Yelkur, Tomkovich &
Pennington, 2012). However, their use of mean stock price rather than stock returns may
skew the results if larger corporate outliers exist. When looking specifically at four of the
TOP sponsors for Beijing, Lee and Groves (2012) undertook a trend analysis for impact
of the Games on stock price and showed mixed results as well as demonstrated that if a
small stock bump was realized it was short lived before returning to baseline following
the Olympics.
In addition to the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup is another heavily
sponsored mega-event that draws international attention. An investigation into the market
response of 30 FIFA commercial affiliates and two of their competitors at initial
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announcement was conducted during the time FIFA was experiencing significant image
difficulties which contributed to the subsequent election of a new president. This
investigation utilized multiple models (CAPM market model, 3-factor model, 4-factor
model) and inferential measures (t-test, Generalized Rank Test, Wilcoxon Sign,
bootstrapping) (Hundt & Horsch, 2019). Results indicated that there was a neutral
response to initial announcements, but there were negative stock responses to the image
difficulties facing FIFA and the election of a new president that did not affect the
sponsor’s competition (Hundt & Horsch, 2019). In an assessment of 11 World Cup
effects on the sectors in the US market utilizing an econometric model, only the financial
sector displayed any appreciable difference, possibly related to liquidity of trading for
foreign investors acting on sporting performance (Curatola, Donadelli, Kizys, & Riedel,
2016).
Since the cost of sponsorship for mega-events is expensive, the perceived success
of the sponsoring companies continues to be of interest. The evaluation of sponsor stock
returns using GARCH methods and log returns for 28 mega-event sponsoring companies
from 2000 through 2009 demonstrates that while volatility increases during the event, not
all companies and events are equal (Filis & Spais, 2012). Out of the 28 companies, 15 did
not show any change in stock price during the event timeline (Filis & Spais, 2012). The
13 remaining companies did see a change in their stock price as a result of the sponsored
event, most notably for companies that are recurrent companies with a strong global
brand. Interestingly, the mega-events being studied were not consistent; McDonald’s
demonstrated a positive stock return during the 2000 and 2004 Olympic Games, but a
negative stock return during the 2008 Olympic Games and 2002 World Cup.
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To better understand the relationship between sponsors and their commercial
success, researchers have also studied the impact of performance of athletic teams and
their sponsor stock response. In an examination of the effect of sponsoring an
international match where one of the three highest exposure football clubs was competing
demonstrated a positive effect on the stock returns of the sponsoring enterprise, with
authors noting that the “most significant takeaway from our analysis is that sponsoring
firms do see abnormal stock returns of up to 2.24% 10 days after the international match,
and abnormal returns of up to 5.03% 20 days beyond the sponsored competition”
(Bouchet, Doellman, Trolio, & Walkup, 2015, p. 200).
In response to performance in the Turkish Soccer League, a positive relationship
between performance and the stock returns for the sponsoring company was identified
(Sarac & Zeren, 2013). It was found that stock returns react in a direct relationship to
their favorite team’s performance; there is a positive reaction with wins and a negative
reaction with losses (Demir & Rigoni, 2017). Using a Brown and Warner market model
combined with an econometric model of stock returns for the jersey sponsors of 114
matches in European soccer demonstrated a positive return when both teams had the
same sponsor, negative returns when there was a loss and magnified effects for both
during important, knockout games (Hanke & Kirchler, 2013). However, other researchers
have disputed this finding, suggesting that wins and losses do not materially affect stock
returns (Vieira, 2012). In a comprehensive review on the relationship between soccer
performance and stock returns using meta-regression analysis, it was found that
performance is not related to stock returns (Geyer-Klingeberg, Hang, Walter, &
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Rathgeber, 2017). Thus, the idea that stock returns may react to performance may be
unfounded.
Sponsoring companies working to utilize mega-events for financial success have
demonstrated mixed results regarding their stock returns. It would appear that the
Olympics demonstrates a slightly positive or neutral stock response to the sponsors
overall, while the World Cup is perceived as less successful for sponsoring companies.
Additionally, team performance has been used to evaluate sponsor success with similarly
mixed results. The stock response to sponsors of different levels or ambush marketing
companies has been largely absent. Mega-events are of interest to not only their sponsors,
but to the host countries as well, for similar reasons. If the hosting of a mega-event is
viewed positively by investors, then the overall stock market of the country in question
will react based on the perceived outcome.
2.10 MEGA-EVENTS AND COUNTRY STOCK RETURNS
Mega-events have the potential to cause market reactions in a host country in
addition to individual companies. If hosting is viewed as a positive economic outcome,
then the host country market index should increase due to the likely investment and
economic activity necessary to execute the event after the bid is awarded, but that is not
generally the case (Liu, 2011; Martins & Serra, 2011). Using a market model and tstatistic in an assessment of the impact of 30 international sporting events (Summer
Olympics, Winter Olympics, FIFA World Cup, European Football Championships,
Commonwealth Games) on a host country’s market, a short-term positive effect was
found (Fah & Hai, 2014). Subsequent analysis for the impact of the event in question did
not demonstrate a positive response from the start of competition (Fah & Hai, 2014).
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Five World Cup announcements between 1994 and 2010 were assessed on the impact to
the host country’s exchange with findings indicating that all countries with the exception
of South Africa showed a slight negative trend or no trend in daily CARs from between
40 days prior up until 26 days after the announcement. It can be concluded that in
general, the announcement of the FIFA World Cup to the host country has had minimal
impact on driving positive CARs over longer and shorter time event windows (Ramdas,
van Gaalen, & Bolton, 2015).
In an examination of the effect of World Cup announcements on host countries’
stock markets for the 1994 through 2010 World Cups on winning and losing countries
host city bids, it appeared that market reactions for the winning bidders were neutral or
negative for countries considered “developed” and positive in countries considered to be
“developing,” especially for Qatar. For losing bidders, the results showed a negative
abnormal stock return at the announcement dates for two developing African countries
classified as lower-middle income countries (Morocco and Egypt), with other losing
countries demonstrating negative returns, on average (Charles & Darne, 2016). Eissa and
Refai (2018) also found that investors in the Doha Stock Exchange viewed the decision to
host the World Cup in a positive light, although this could be related to the corruption in
the voting process. The Brazil FIFA World Cup announcement in 2010 demonstrated
negative response for the event window studied [-1, 2] (Charles & Darne, 2016).
Announcements for the World Cup and Olympics were also assessed on the host
country index from 1974-2013 with results indicating that there was an increase in the
index in response to the announcement, but that the event itself did not demonstrate an
appreciable market response. Additionally, when comparing economic size via GDP, the
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countries with smaller GDP had greater returns (Mohamed, Oettle, & Stewart, 2015)
suggesting that smaller countries expect to achieve greater economic growth as a result of
hosting. Utilizing a single model with stock returns regressed against the lagged country
index for five Summer Olympic Games announcements between 1988 and 2004
demonstrated that Seoul and Athens had a positive reaction to the announcement, but the
other markets did not. For the losing cities, only one of the five announcements, Athens,
demonstrated a market reaction, with a negative response in 1996 (Nishio, Lim, &
Downward, 2009).
Mirman and Sharma (2010) analyzed the announcement effects of winning and
losing bids for both the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, beginning with the 1996
Summer Olympic Games announced in 1990, up until the announcement of the 2012
Summer Olympic Games awarded in 2006. They found a negative stock market reaction
for winners of the bid to host Winter Olympic Games and insignificant positive reaction
for winners of the Summer Olympic Games. The announcement of 15 Olympic Games
host cities was found to have a positive 2% impact of hosting the Summer Games, but no
effect was identified for Winter Games hosts or cities who were not chosen (Dick &
Wang, 2010). Moreover, returns varied based on economy size, with smaller economies
demonstrating larger increases, although only for short durations.
In an examination of the 2000 Sydney Olympics on Australia’s stock index, no
impact was found. In an analysis of the market segments, four of the 20 (building
materials, developers and contractors, engineering and miscellaneous services)
demonstrated positive returns. Additionally, the companies that had a positive return post
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announcement were those located in New South Wales, where Sydney is the capital
(Berman, Brooks, & Davidson, 2000).
When comparing the effect of the announcement that Athens would host the 2004
Olympic Games instead of Milan, the Athens Stock Exchange had a positive reaction,
with the industrials sector gaining the most in anticipation of the future infrastructure
work, while the stock market in Milan showed no discernable change as a result of the
announcement (Veraros, Kasimati & Dawson, 2004). A comparison of the Shanghai,
Paris and Toronto stock exchanges in response to the 2008 Olympic announcement
showed a positive but short duration response on Shanghai’s index while those of losing
cities Paris and Toronto had no such reaction (Leeds, Mirikitani, & Tang, 2009). The
utilities and property sectors of the Shanghai index were also positive, while the
industrials were negative, which was different than those discovered by Veraros, et al.
Using a GARCH method to assess the impact of the London 2012 announcement,
results indicated that both the winning bid of London and losing bid of Paris stock
exchanges had positive returns. Additionally, both produced negative returns following
the terrorist attacks in London the following day (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2008). By
utilizing different estimation methods Asteriou, Samitas and Kenourgios (2013)
evaluated the effect of the London Olympic Games announcement on the London stock
exchange sectors. Under an OLS estimation, 5 of 28 sectors had a positive response,
whereas only 3 sectors showed a positive response with a GARCH estimation.
The impact of the 2020 Olympic Games announcements on the indexes of the
winning country Japan, and the losing country Spain, showed no effect; however, Turkey,
another losing finalist, had both positive and negative returns in the event window. These
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conflicting results were most likely the result of confounding political events (Sullivan &
Leeds, 2016). It was believed that Tokyo would win its 2020 bid, so perhaps the
announcement was not seen as new information. As is the case with firm level evidence,
the announcement of hosting a mega-event does not demonstrate a clear signal regarding
expected future returns as a result of hosting.
Mega-event hosting has been suggested to be positive for the host country
economy through metrics besides just the performance of its major stock market index.
However, many researchers find neutral or a negative response to hosting
announcements, calling into question the ability for a mega-event to positively impact its
stock market, let alone spur country wide economic growth. As many mega-events are
isolated to certain cities or regions, this may help to understand the non-positive
responses. Mega-event hosting and international sport competition may lead to positive
civic pride even if discernable positive changes in economic conditions are not present.
Some researchers have, therefore, examined the effect of National Team performance on
the stock market of the host country.
Using mean returns post-match for the English National soccer team between
1984 and 2002, researchers identified that the London Stock Exchange increased after a
win and decreased after a loss lending support for a sentimental reaction (Ashton,
Gerrard, & Hudson, 2003). However, a replication of their study did not achieve the same
results; instead, it suggested that team performance does not impact stock return (Klein,
Zwergel, & Fock, 2009). In an assessment of national team performance in soccer and
other sports using an econometric GARCH model, a national team win was found to have
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a neutral response on the national index, but a loss did cause a decrease in the index in
question (Edmans et al, 2007).
Further analysis using the stock price of one firm that is listed on two exchanges
made it possible to ascertain differences between the countries based on sentiment. The
games under investigation occurred when France and Italy were eliminated from World
Cup competition in 2010 and the assessment was the difference in price of a single
company that was cross-listed on the two exchanges. Results indicated that during the
match, the price decreased on the exchange for the losing team leading authors to
conclude that there exists an undervaluation by investors (Ehrmann & Jansen, 2015).
If investors are distracted by the loss of the team they support, that sentiment may
not impact the stock market, but a decrease in market activity may be observed. Studying
medal results of four summer Olympic Games on eight international markets (U.S., U.K.,
France, Australia, Netherlands, Germany, South Korea and Japan) and five multi-national
sponsoring firms (Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Panasonic, Visa and Samsung) indicated that
there was no significant association between medal performance and abnormal returns
over the next trading day (Yang & Markellos, 2018). Additionally, trading volumes and
volatility were lower during the Olympic Games and are further reduced by the number
of the gold medals won over the previous day (Yang & Markellos, 2018).
Kaplansky ant Levy (2010) found that there was a negative response on the New
York Stock Exchange unrelated to seasonality for the 15 World Cups studied. There was
also found to be no relationship between country performance and stock returns in those
countries during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Vieira, 2012). In an extension of
the work of Kaplansky and Levy, it was found that sport sentiment mainly affects the
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financial sector but no others (Curatola, Donadelli, Kizys, & Riedel, 2016). In a critique
of using the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index as a market
control, Gerlach (2011) matched counties to their neighbor to eliminate bias. These
matched countries allowed for regional differences to be identified between a team that
played and a team that did not. Results indicated that the countries had similar market
movements regardless of team participation which is not in line with investor sentiment
following World Cup matches. It is more likely that the changes in the market were due
to other news (Gerlach, 2011).
A paper presenting evidence that soccer match scores affect stock market returns
in different ways based on the success of four country’s studied showed that countries
viewed as having relatively more successful soccer teams, Spain and the UK, indicate
stock market returns decrease and agents become more risk averse after a loss. The
results from countries with relatively less successful soccer teams, Chile and Turkey,
reveal that stock market returns increase and agents become more risk accepting after a
win (Berument & Ceylan, 2012). By comparing pre and post-match stock returns for
three teams in the Italian League (Rome, Lazio, Juventus) it was found that winning is
associated with higher returns than losing or ties (Boido & Fasano, 2007). In an
assessment of Italian stock market responses to the Italian National team in FIFA
competition, there was a positive increase in returns in response to international
competition (Vicentini & Graziano, 2016).
Through viewing sentiment with a different lens by assessing returns during the
course of the Olympics based on winning medals, Floros (2010) found that Greek athletes
winning medals showed a positive return for the Athens Stock Exchange and national
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sponsors. Another sentimental stock market reaction tested the hypothesis that tourism
increases following mega-event hosting. Utilizing publicly traded tourism companies
(hotels and airlines) to assess the effect of FIFA World Cup performance on tourism
found that no generalizable effect exists, with the exception of Spain winning in 2010
using an event window of [-2, 2] for the final game (Nicolau & Sharma, 2018). Further
analysis of Spain elucidates a positive response to the National Team winning the 2010
World Cup on the market value of the leading Spanish airline company (Iberia) and hotel
company (Sol Melia) resulting from a hypothesized increase in brand knowledge in
response to the World Cup (Nicolau, 2012).
If mega-events increase economic growth in the host country, then it would be
expected that announcements of the host would result in a demonstrated market increase,
but that has not been the case; however, the planning process can lead to short-term
economic growth (Bruckner & Pappa, 2011) that is not sustained over time. This lack of
a response may indicate either pessimism or skepticism on the part of investors who do
not necessarily believe that hosting will result in appreciable growth. It has been
suggested that perhaps investors react to National Team performance, but that has also
not necessarily been the case. This might be attributable to the lack of a financial
relationship between a country and performance, which is different from that of a team
sponsor or a publicly owned team. For teams like Manchester United, who are publicly
traded, their on-field performance may impact their stock returns.
2.11 STOCK RETURNS AND TEAM PERFORMANCE
Sport leagues in the U.S. do not currently have any publicly traded franchises,
although there have been publicly traded franchises in the past. However, many
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international clubs are publicly traded. Since some investors act on sentiment and
emotion, sport outcome has been hypothesized to have an impact on trading. By studying
Boston Celtics stock (which was publically traded from 1986 to 2002) activity from
January 1, 1987 through May 31, 1998 it was discovered that trading volatility was
greater during the season compared to the off season. Moreover, team losses were related
to a negative stock response, while wins were not, but playoff wins or losses were related
to a positive response (Brown & Hartzell, 2001). Since there have been few publically
traded US sport franchises, there is a dearth of research on team performance and stock
market returns. However, there have been a few studies of European clubs and stock
performance
In a study of German club Borussia Dortmund stock returns for the 2003/2004
soccer season, a close relationship to team performance was noted (Stadtmann, 2006).
Using betting odds and team performance for 16 British soccer clubs from 1999-2002, a
positive abnormal return was found for wins and a negative return was discovered for
losses, while betting odds were neutral (Palomino, Renneboog, & Zhang, 2005).
Following the premise that what should affect stocks is new information, 19 English
soccer clubs’ change in stock price was found for important games, points achieved
compared to expected outcome, and goal differential demonstrating that expected
performance did not cause a change while unexpected performance did (Bell, Brooks,
Mathews, & Sutcliffe, 2012).
If the stock returns of a company are related to financial performance rather than
sport performance, then it would not be expected to see a stock market reaction to onfield performance. This area of academic inquiry has not been fully established and more
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can be done to understand the relationship between on-field performance and stock
returns of publicly traded sports teams.
2.12 SUMMARY
Event study methods have been employed extensively to investigate stock market
performance in response to sporting events, both from an investor level (Edmans, Norli,
& Garcia, 2007; Kaplansky & Levy, 2010), county level (Ashton, Gerrard, & Hudson,
2003; Berman, Brooks, & Davidson, 2000; Leeds, Mirikitani, & Tang, 2009) and
sponsorship level (Abril, Sanchez, & Recio, 2018; Farrelly & Frame, 1997; Hino &
Takeda, 2019). To date, a consensus on the relationship between mega-events and
company/country stock returns is absent. It would appear, that in general, the
announcement of sponsoring a mega-event is neutral to slightly positive, while the
awarding of the host country appears to be neutral-to-positive for the Summer Olympic
Games, but neutral-to-negative for the Winter Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup.
Despite this body of work, the research regarding the impact of multiple mega-events on
a single country is limited. Moreover, little inquiry has focused on the success of ambush
marketing from a market standpoint. This dissertation looks to examine those research
areas.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This is a proposed three-part investigation where the first portion compares the
reaction of the Brazilian stock market to other host city bids for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro
Summer Olympic Games and the second studies the Brazilian stock market as it reacted
to the dual announcements of being a World Cup host and subsequently an Olympic host.
The third study is an assessment of the returns for companies of varying sponsorship
levels over the duration of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics and 11 days beyond the
closing ceremony. Rather than focus on a number of Olympic Games, this study will
heed the advice of Hundt and Horsch (2019) and focus on one event to isolated effect and
avoid contamination over time.
3.1 BRAZIL MARKET RESPONSE TO 2016 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES
HOSTING ANNOUNCEMENT
FIFA made the decision for Brazil to host the 2014 World Cup on October 30,
2007 in an uncontested bidding process (FIFA, n.d.), while the IOC announced their
decision on October 2, 2009 awarding the 2016 Summer Olympic Games to Rio de
Janeiro over finalists Madrid, Spain; Tokyo, Japan; and Chicago, United States (IOC,
2009). Later, Sergio Cabral, former Governor of Rio de Janeiro, testified to paying over
$2 million in total to bribe nine IOC committee members in order to sway the Olympic
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vote to Brazil (Panja, 2019). The Olympic announcement was seen as a surprise and
carried potential significant international economic consequences if the Brazilian market
responded favorably, especially if the markets for losing countries were depressed
following the announcement. Subsequently, the World Cup was held from June 12, 2014
through July 13, 2014 and Brazil’s national team competed in the quarterfinals on July 4,
the semi-finals July 8 and the consolation game on July 12. The 2016 Olympics were
hosted from August 5 through August 21.
While an OLS model fit has been found to be an accepted method in event
studies, with similar results as other methods, there are times when allowing for
correlation of the error term improves the interpretability in the model (Binder, 1998).
One such time is when events occur in multiple firms at the same time, in which case
there may be correlation in the error in the predicted return that is similar across all the
firms (Binder, 1998). In this case, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model can
improve the accuracy of the estimation (Tanuwidjaja, 2007). SUR’s main contribution is
to allow for assessment of events that affect several firms, and each firm’s reaction to that
event (Binder, 1985).
When events are contemporaneous (occur at the same time), the utilization of
dummy variables provides the same numerical estimates as a two-step event study
method (Karafiath, 1988). It also allows for the utilization of the dummy variables to
assess the average returns of a number of firms that are subject to the same event window
that result in smaller standard errors (Salinger, 1992). While initially used to test the
effect of regulatory changes on companies within a specific sector, a multivariate model
is useful for examining the returns of several events that have the same timeline (Binder,
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1998). The usefulness of a single model is that it adjusts for contemporaneous correlation
and heteroscedasticity involving the firms. In the context of this dissertation, the
announcement of mega-events could potentially affect stock market indices of several
countries. Additionally, the event window for the Olympic Games will be shared by all
countries looking to align themselves with that event. In these instances, a SUR model is
an effective method of evaluation. The general OLS model for evaluation is:
Ri,t = β0,i + β1,Rmt + δi,s Ds + εi,t
Where R is the rate of return (adjusted close at day t – adjusted close at day t-1/
adjusted close at day t-1), for country i at day t. The parameters are the intercept, β0, for
country i and β1 for the global index, MSCI, rate of return at day t. The variables of
interest are the abnormal return, δ for country i for event day, s (-20, 20), that takes a
dummy, D, value of 1 for the day s in question and 0 otherwise and ε is the residual for
country i at day t.
The SUR model is the same as the OLS market model, but exists in a stacked
form for each country in the event window, specifically, as follows:
R1,t = β0,1 + β1,1Rmt + δ1,sDs + ε1,t
R2,t = β0,2 + β1,2Rmt + δ2,sDs + ε2,t
R3,t = β0,3 + β1,3Rmt + δ3,sDs + ε3,t
R4,t = β0,4 + β1,4Rmt + δ4,sDs + ε4,t
R5,t = β0,5 + β1,5Rmt + δ5,sDs + ε5,t
R6,t = β0,6 + β1,6Rmt + δ6,sDs + ε6,t
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Where R1 is the rate of return of Brazil’s index at day t, β0,1 is the intercept of the
model for Brazil, β1,1 is the coefficient for the market return Rm (MSCI) at day t, δ as the
coefficient for event day, s (-20, 20), D is the dummy variable for the event day equal to
1 for that day, s, and 0 otherwise or excess return, and ε is the residual error in the model
for Brazil at day t. The other models relate to the stock exchanges of 2=Spain (Bolsa de
Madrid, BOLYY, Madrid Stock Market General Index IGBM), 3=Japan (Tokyo Stock
Exchange TYO, Nikkei 225 index) and 4=the United States (S & P 500) to examine their
market reaction in response to the announcements. Two additional markets are also be
included that would be considered “neutral” as it was not in the final decision for hosting.
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange, DAX) = 5 and Australia (Australian Securities
Exchange, ASX) = 6 can serve as a comparison for the impact of the event on the
countries involved, as well as for countries uninvolved in the final outcome. Additionally,
a summation was added for the assessment for a longer event period, one extended from
twenty days prior to the announcement to 20 days post announcement (-20, 20) and the
second extended from the date of the announcement to five days post announcement (0,
5).
Brazil’s stock market (BOVESPA) is one of the largest in the world and is usually
considered to be an emerging market, composed of 50 stocks traded on the Sao Paulo
exchange in a weighted average (Trading Economics, 2019). There are two proposed
benchmark indexes for Brazil, with the first being the MSCI World Index and the second
being the Argentinean index. Some concerns have been raised over benchmarking to the
world index as it may not be appropriate for some index comparisons (Gerlach, 2011).
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For the examination of the IOC’s announcement of Rio de Janeiro being awarded
the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the data will be collected from Yahoo Finance! for
the 250 days prior to the announcement with an event window starting 20 days prior to
the announcement date and continuing for 20 days post announcement for a 41-day
window as recommended by Leeds and Leeds (2012).
3.2 BRAZIL STOCK MARKET RESPONSE TO MEGA-EVENTS
For the examination of the Brazil’s stock market index, BOVESPA, the rate of
return for the index (closing day t-closing day t-1/closing day t-1) will be collected from
Yahoo Finance! for the 250 days prior to the FIFA World Cup host city announcement
October 30, 2007 and extend 21 days post the closing ceremonies of the 2016 Summer
Olympic Games on August 21, 2016. Assessment will be conducted with an OLS
regression model of the BOVESPA rate of return to that of the MSCI market and nearby
country, Argentina (MERVAL).
Since there is significant time between the four mega-events (FIFA World Cup
announcement, IOC announcement, FIFA World Cup, Summer Olympics) they can be
isolated and each mega-event will be assessed independently to determine the market
response of Brazil to each of the events. Additionally, the timeframe for the actual events
are as long as, or shorter, than the typical 20 days post event date, which allows for
evaluation of the daily and cumulative returns for the 2014 World Cup and 2016
Olympics. If hosting creates an economic stimulus there should be an increase in the
market response during these time frames. In the 2014 World Cup, Brazil’s national team
made it through qualifying to the semi-finals, where they lost. They then lost the third
place consolation game a couple of days later. Since team performance has the potential
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to impact the market, the use of daily returns of the entire World Cup will indicate
whether there is a change following the team performance.
The general model for assessment of each of the four independent models is:
Ri,t = β0,i + β1Rmt + δsDs + εi,t
Where R is the rate of return of Brazil’s stock index, i, (BOVESPA) at day t, β0 is
the intercept, Rm is the rate of return of the MSCI or Argentina’s index (MERVAL) at
day t, δ is the abnormal return at day s (-20, 20) with dummy code, D, of 1 signifying the
day and 0 otherwise, and ε signifying the residual.
A follow up evaluation assesses whether there is a longer term abnormal response
of different holding periods resulting from the dual announcements on the BOVESPA
stock index given as:
Ri,t = β0,i + β1Rmt + ∑δsDs + εi,t
Where R is the rate of return of the BOVESPA on day t, β0 is the intercept, Rm is
the market return of the MSCI or MERVAL at day t, ∑ is the summation for the event
days, s, for different holding periods signified by dummy variable D and ε is the residual.
The event windows utilized for assessment are [-20, 20] and [0, 5] to ascertain if a
response exists.
Results of this second study may help to elucidate the effect of the different megaevents on the stock market of a single host country. The magnitude of the coefficients
also highlights the market response to each of the events identified. Additionally, 95%
confidence intervals will be constructed for the coefficient for the event and event
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window for the five countries. While not typically done with event studies, the inclusion
of confidence intervals allows for a broader assessment for the magnitude of the market
reaction and whether they are economically large or small (MacKinnon, 2002).
3.3.1 STOCK MARKET RESPONSE FOR COMPANIES OF DIFFERING
SPONSORSHIP LEVELS DURING THE 2016 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES
A third study will be conducted to evaluate the rate of return for companies over
the duration of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. The statistical method proposed for use in
the assessment of stock rate of return for IOC TOP sponsors, United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) sponsors and non-official, but competing, or ambushing, companies
during the Olympics is an SUR model. Typical event study methods look for the reaction
of a firm’s stock response to a specified event (Brown & Warner, 1985). In the case of
the Olympics, the event is the duration of the Games themselves. The general model for
each company in the assessment for both the Olympic period and Post-Olympic period is:
Ri,t = β0,i + β1Rmt + δsDs + εi,t
Where R is the rate of return for company i at day t, β0 is the intercept for
company i, Rm is the market return (S and P 500 for U.S. companies), δ is the abnormal
return at day s signified with dummy, D, and ε is the residual in the model. A dummy
code is also included for Mondays as a Monday effect has been discussed in the literature
(Coates & Humphries, 2008) where some firms show an abnormal Monday return.
In the case of the Olympics, all the companies in the sample share the same event
window, which may have errors that are similar across all the organizations (Baltazar &
Santos, 2003; Taunuwidajaja, 2007). The use of an SUR model accommodates this by
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allowing for this correlation in the model, which in this case is the 2016 Summer
Olympic Games held in Rio de Janeiro from August 5 through August 21. If deemed
appropriate, the specific model is constructed for each company as follows:
R1,t = β0,1 + β1,1 Rmt + δ1,sDs + ε1,t
R2,t = β0,2 + β1,2 Rmt + δ2,sDs + ε2,t
…
Rn,t = β0,n + β1,n Rmt + δn,sDs + εn,t
Where R represents the rate of return or firm 1 on day t, Rm is the return of the
benchmark index for the company being studied (S & P 500 for companies traded in the
US), δ is the abnormal return for the specified event day s, D is a dummy code that takes
the value of 1 for the specified day s and 0 otherwise, and ε is the residual error in the
model. For the cumulative abnormal returns for each company, a summation term is
added for all the dates in the window, which allows for assessment of returns over the
duration of the Olympics Games as follows:
CAR1,t = β0,1 + β1,1 Rmt + ∑ δ1,sDs + ε1,t
CAR2,t = β0,2 + β1,2 Rmt + ∑ δ2,sDs + ε2,t
…
CARn,t = β0,n + β1,n Rmt + ∑ δn,sDs + εn,t
Following the event window pre-event specification, the returns for the
companies and specified benchmark will be collected for 250 days prior to the Games.
The pre-event window will end 20 days prior to the start of the Olympics to prevent an
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increase in the variance from influencing the event window (Leeds & Leeds, 2012). The
first event window will be the day of the Opening Ceremony and extend to the Closing
Ceremony (August 21). A second event window will be conducted to ascertain if there
are any longer-term gains from sponsorship after the conclusion of the Games. This will
have the same pre-event window, but an event window extending from the first trading
day following the closing ceremony (August 22) to 11 trading days afterwards. These
dual event windows allow for the assessment of abnormal returns both during the Games
and after their conclusion to assess for longer duration returns as a result of Olympic
sponsorship. The company’s daily rate of return data and the appropriate benchmark
returns (S & P 500 for companies in the USA) will be collected from Yahoo Finance! for
the 250 days prior to the opening ceremony.
While the OLS and SUR model will show estimates for the returns of the
individual companies and how their stock performed during the Olympics, it will not
offer a comparison between the companies or for different levels of sponsorship. For the
assessment of differences in these cumulative abnormal returns for the companies at
varying levels of sponsorship, these CARs will be a dependent variable for a crosssectional regression model for independent variable’s effect on these returns. Since TOP
sponsors incur significant costs as a result of their sponsorship, they have a motivation to
ensure that they realize a positive return on their investment and should have higher
cumulative returns than other sponsorship levels (Baim, Goukasian, & Misch, 2015).
Since the coefficients are calculated for each company in the sample, they can be
saved and used for additional firm-specific variables that may help explain abnormal
returns through a cross-sectional regression analysis. This secondary analysis can be
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conducted utilizing an OLS regression model and include the factors BAI score (higher
scores more affiliated), sponsorship (TOP, USOC, Ambush), company size (measured as
market cap in $ Billions USD), industry sector (tech, sport), and profitability, as
measured as return on assets (Clark, Cornwell, & Pruitt, 2002) that have been examined
in the literature. The models for assessment of the Olympic period and the post-Olympic
period would be:
CARi,t = β0,i + β1,iBAI + β2,iSponsor + β3,iSize + β4,iSector + β5,iROA + εi,t
Where CAR is the cumulative return for company i at event period t, β0 is the
intercept of the model and the independent firm variables are BAI score, Sponsor level
(TOP, USOC, Ambush), size, sector, ROA and the residual error, ε.
3.3.2 SAMPLE FOR STUDY 3
The proposed sample will be constructed by collecting the names of the
companies that were listed as worldwide Olympic partners (TOP) or USOC sponsors for
the Rio Games from IEG’s Rio Report (2016). Additionally, companies identified as
ambushers by the Global Language Monitor (GLM) index as being ambushers were
included for analysis. The GLM evaluates the brand affiliation between the organization
and Olympics; a higher score on the index corresponds to a greater brand affiliation and,
therefore, association (Pavitt, 2016). Companies were listed as ambushers who were not
identified as either TOP or USOC sponsors, but were on the index as being identified
with the Olympics. If a company was not a publicly listed organization (i.e., private), it
was eliminated from the data set since returns cannot be assessed for private

72

organizations. The final sample size for the companies affiliated with the Olympics
(Table 3.1) included 10 TOP sponsors, 11 USOC sponsors and 8 ambush companies.
Table 3.1. Sample of Companies
Company
Coca Cola
GE
Bridgestone
Panasonic
Visa
P and G
Atos
Omega
Swatch
Samsung
McDonalds
Att
BMW
BP
Budweiser
Dicks
Hershey
Kellog
Nike
TDAmeritrade
Citi
United
IBM
Siemens
Pepsi
Starbucks
UnderArmour
Phillips
Unilever
Michelin

Sponsorship
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
Top
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
USOC
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush
Ambush

BAI
89.59
129.98
15.51
45.84
4.98
19.85
0.16
84
363.39
136.13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
237.62
0
0
0
89.17
124.2
130.4
107.28
79.62
107.57
115.84
66.28
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For the evaluation of the Olympics event window, a check for confounding events
will be conducted to assess if any of the companies in the sample had other relevant,
economic information that was released during the event window in question. This will
involve doing a search on Google and business websites (CNBC, Wall Street Journal,
Bloomberg) to make sure no additional information may impact stock results (Deitz,
Evans, & Hansen, 2012; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). If a company had a confounding
event, they may be eliminated from further evaluation. A sensitivity analysis can be
performed for the models both with, and without, the company in question to identify
what impact it has on the results (Klein, Zwergel, & Fock, 2009). However, if the event
in question was related to their sponsorship of the Olympics, then that could be a
leveraging strategy for their sponsorship and those companies would continue to be
included since this may positively influence their returns and could be directly related to
their sponsorship activities.
Understanding the common concerns regarding event studies, this investigation
will initially conduct analysis on the raw returns of each company in the sample and
create a market model against the appropriate benchmark (Brown & Warner, 1985). If,
however, the returns are found to be non-normal in their distribution then the log returns
will be used for the dependent variable (Hudson & Gregoriou, 2015). Although this
makes the interpretation slightly more difficult given that the coefficients explain the log
return rather than the actual return, the accuracy of the estimates should be improved.
3.4 LIMITATIONS
One the main concerns with the use of an event study is the estimation period for
the pre-event model (Leeds & Leeds, 2012). There have been many time frames used in
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the model, with a minimum of 170 days being identified (Leeds & Leeds, 2012)
extending up to 240 days (MacKinlay, 1997). The use of the window allows for
regression results to be accurate. Additionally, both MacKinlay (1997) and Leeds &
Leeds (2012) recommend the use of a 20-day pre and 20-day post event window for a 41day total event window. Despite this recommendation, very few studies extend to a postevent window of 20 days. The purpose of the pre-event window is to identify if there are
any leakages of information that occur around the identified event, while the post-event
identifies if there are lags in the market’s incorporation of the event into the returns, as
well as a longer duration holding period (Leeds & Leeds, 2012). Many of the studies in
the literature have very short event windows extending from one-to-five days post-event
at most, with many just looking for a short term one day post-event window.
Furthermore, the event window for pre and post-event is used to calculate
abnormal returns on a symmetrical basis (same number of days prior to and post event),
with the result being that there are very few abnormal cumulative holding periods. The
use of asymmetric holding periods is rarely used, but is more fitting given the null
hypothesis that the event causes a change, not that there is an expected abnormal return
prior to an event. The incorporation of a pre-event window in the CAR may change the
results as it is not expected that there is a return before an event, just that one exists postevent, yet many studies do not account for that. Subsequently, the event window should
be shifted to the date of the event and the time frame after the event for identification of
an abnormal response.
A second concern regarding the use of event studies is the non-normality of the
data (Binder, 1998; Brown & Warner, 1985). The result of this has been to use the natural
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log of returns, rather than returns themselves, and to incorporate non-parametric
statistical methods (Cowan, 1992). Log returns have demonstrated a more normal
distribution (Hudson & Gregoriou, 2015), however, the comparison of the conclusions
drawn from using log returns has not been compared to the use of the regular returns. In
their review of both simple mean and logarithmic mean returns, Hudson and Gregoriou
(2015) do demonstrate that the coefficients differ in magnitude with simple means being
higher than logarithmic means, which can change in significance over a short duration.
Due to this, the inclusion of confidence intervals is added thus limiting reliance on p
values to determine the significance of an effect (Kmetz, 2019). The calculation of log
returns is given as:
Rt = ln(Pt/Pt-1)
Where the return on day t is the natural log of the closing Price on day t/Price on day t-1
(Berman et al, 2000). The log returns can also be calculated by subtracting the log of the
price on day t from the log price on day t-1 (Hanke & Kirchler, 2013):
Rt = ln(Pt) – ln(Pt-1)
While the use of the log returns allows for the assessment of whether the event is
related to a positive, negative or neutral response, the interpretation of the effect is not as
straightforward. However, if returns are non-normal then log returns can be used to
correct to a more normal distribution for parametric examination.
A third concern is the impact that confounding events have on the outcome, which
can change the interpretation of the results (Deitz, et al, 2012). Confounding events cloud
the event study by including information that can affect stock price, but are unrelated to
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the event in question. If included, it can cause a positive or negative reaction depending
on the information that makes the impact of the event in question invalid. The
recommendation for handling a confounding event is to delete that company from the
sample (Klein, Zwergel, & Fock, 2009). In spite of these limitations, the use of an event
study is prevalent across many industries, including sport, in examining the reaction of a
company to an event.
Additionally, there exist three main concerns regarding the validity of the
statistical impact of event studies with the first being that markets are indeed efficient, the
second is that event day is accurately identified and third is that there are no confounding
events during the assessment period (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Moreover, the small
sample sizes encountered in the event study literature is problematic with assumptions of
normality, and checks for outliers and bootstrapping methods are recommended (Hein &
Westfall, 2004). Bootstrapping for confidence intervals has also been shown to provide
more accurate estimates in a SUR model if there are concerns regarding normality or
accuracy of the estimation (Rilstone & Veall, 1996).
For this proposed study on sponsorship returns, there is an identified event
window (duration of the Olympic Games), but not an individual date. Rather than utilize
a single date, the event will be the date of the Opening Ceremony through the closing
ceremony and the CAR of each company during this timeframe. This can be
accomplished either by using the daily CAR for the event window, or the weekly return
for each company in the sample. The daily CAR will be expected to have variation over
the course of the Olympics, but will allow for the assessment of the aggregate stock
response during the timeframe. Adopting this method also allows for the possibility for
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inclusion of firm level variables that may help to explain returns over this timeframe such
as company size, industry sector, sponsorship level, congruence and profitability (Clark,
Cornwell, & Pruitt, 2002; Fama & French, 1993). Unfortunately, it is not possible to
acquire all the company information for the Olympics such as activation costs, daily
sponsorship activity and sponsored athlete activity that may impact company returns.
While the use of the CAR will address whether there are differences in returns based on
level of sponsorship, care is required regarding the number of independent variables that
can be considered, as a minimum of two subjects per variable is recommended, however,
more is preferred (Austin & Steyerberg, 2015).
A possible concern for assessing several events on one index may be
autocorrelation in the model that can generate misleading conclusions (Veraros, Kasimiti,
& Hudson, 2004). Since the events are both independent and do not cluster in a short
period of time (being more than 250 days between any of the events), four independent
models can be identified for the Brazil index, rather than a single model. If several
models are used, and it is determined that correlation does exist in the equations, then a
GARCH model may be a more appropriate model. Additionally, given the length of the
World Cup, weekly returns may be a better choice than daily returns, which may increase
the potential for increased variability and spurious results, but the use of a CAR for the
event time frame can help to decrease this.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 BRAZIL MARKET RESPONSE TO 2016 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES
HOSTING ANNOUNCEMENT
The first study was an examination of the effect of the IOC’s announcement
awarding Rio de Janeiro as the host Olympic city upon the stock market index of Brazil,
Spain, Japan, The United States of America, Germany and Australia. Using an ordinary
least squares (OLS) dummy coded regression model, there was no abnormal effect
identified for any of the countries on the day prior to the announcement, the
announcement date or the day following the announcement. Interestingly, the only
positive return for the announcement was Brazil’s stock market index with a return of
1.1% (p=0.669); however, this was not abnormal. For event window ranging from day 0
to day 5 post event, the returns ranged in magnitude across the countries with Japan
demonstrating a gain of 0.7% (p=0.345) and Brazil showing a positive return of 5.5%
(p=0.011). For the complete event window of 20 days prior to the announcement to 20
days post announcement, the USA had the largest cumulative return of 4.4% (p=<0.001),
while Japan had a loss of 3% (p=0.008) (Table 4.1).
Results using the natural log of the returns demonstrated a similar response as
using rate of return. Again, Brazil’s index is the only one to demonstrate a positive return
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with a 1.1% (p=0.666) increase on the date of the announcement. The five-day CAR
window post announcement ranges from Japan’s increase of 1% (p=0.285) to Brazil’s
increase of 6.4% (p=0.006). For the full 41-day CAR of 20 days before to 20 days post
announcement, Spain showed a loss of 2% (p=0.064) while the USA showed a gain of
4.8% (p<0.001) (Table 4.2). It appears that the estimation between log returns and rate of
return for daily returns provide similar estimates.
A model using a SUR was conducted using rate of return and log returns,
however, some adjustments had to be made to the data as the analysis required that
observations be of equal length and there were asynchronous trading dates within the
daily returns. To account for this, the data was imputed in the estimation window with the
average return between the date preceding and following a missing return minimize
estimation error. In the event window, any missing data was treated as a zero so that
averaging the return would not result in inaccurate CAR calculations. Brazil had 12
missing returns in the estimation window and two in the event window, Spain had seven
missing returns in the estimation window and zero in the event window, Japan had 18
missing returns in the estimation window and five in the event window, USA had seven
missing returns in the estimation window and one in the event window, Germany had
seven in the estimation window and zero in the event window, and Australia had six in
the estimation window and zero in the event window. The results using rate of return
demonstrate Brazil’s index increasing 1.2% (p=0.645) on the announcement date with a
five day CAR of 6% (p=0.002) (Table 4.3). Furthermore, Brazil had a 41-day CAR of
7.1% (p<0.001), while Japan had a decrease of 5% (p<0.001) over the same window. The
use of log returns in the SUR demonstrated a similar 1.2% (p=0.647) increase for Brazil
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on Day 0 with a five-day CAR of 6.1% (p=0.008). Brazil’s 41-day CAR was 6.7%
(p<0.001) and Spain showed a loss of 0.5% (p=0.351) over the 41-day event window
(Table 4.4).
Overall, the results from these analyses indicate that there is no abnormal
response to the IOC’s host city announcement on any of the contending countries
surrounding the immediate announcement date. While Brazil did demonstrate a positive
coefficient, the magnitude was small and not abnormal. The other five countries
(including two control countries) did not demonstrate an abnormal return, however, each
displayed a negative coefficient in response to the announcement date. This analysis
included rate of return, log returns and SUR and all estimations demonstrated similar
results. It does not appear that the use of log returns for daily change improves the
estimation. Additionally, the 5-day CAR and 41-day CAR differed between the countries,
however, the BOVESPA was positive for both cases, which may suggest that the
announcement had a longer term positive impact on Brazil’s market.
4.2 BRAZIL STOCK MARKET RESPONSE TO MEGA-EVENTS
The second analysis was an examination of the impact of mega-events on the
stock index of a single host country, in this case Brazil. The total time frame for
examination extends from July 3, 2006 through the completion of the Summer Olympic
Games in August 2016 for the four events. Since there existed more than 250 days before
each event, four separate event analyses were conducted, each with their own 250-day
estimation window that ended 20 trading days prior to each study (two announcements
and two mega-events). The MSCI World Index as a benchmark was not utilized as a
benchmark index in this analysis due to a limitation in the availability of returns on
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Yahoo! Finance for the dates in question. Therefore, the use of the neighboring country,
Argentina’s index (MERVAL) was used. This is in accordance with prior research
indicating that the utilization of a neighboring country may be a more appropriate use
than a broader index (Gerlach, 2011).
Using daily rate of return, no effect for either of the mega-event announcements
was identified (Table 4.5). Neither of the event announcements demonstrate a daily return
distinguishable from zero. The CAR period day 0 to day 5 for the FIFA announcement
was a loss of 1.4% (p=0.088) while the IOC announcement was a gain of 0.4%
(p=0.347). For the 41 day CAR surrounding the FIFA announcement, there was a loss of
6.2% (p<0.001) while a loss of 1.8% (p=0.035) existed for the Olympic announcement. It
would appear that a mega-event announcement does not have an appreciable effect on the
stock market of Brazil at the date of announcement. There does exist a larger cumulative
negative effect for the 41-day event window surrounding the announcements.
A second OLS model was performed for the World Cup hosted by Brazil from
June 12, 2004 through July 13, 2014 utilizing the daily rate of return which demonstrated
a World Cup CAR of 0.9% (p=0.218), however, only one event day had an abnormal
return differing from zero (day 6 with a loss of 2.5%) (Table 4.6). The 41-day CAR
surrounding the World Cup demonstrated a 0.5% (p=0.335) return. Moreover, results do
not indicate that there is a national team performance effect on the index in question. This
is in contrast to Edmans, Garcia, & Norli (2007) and Ashton Gerrard, & Hudson (2003)
who did find that there was an effect on index for the host country performance.
Another OLS regression was performed for the Olympics held from August 5
through August 21, 2016. The Olympic period demonstrated a CAR of 3.7% (p=0.002),
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while the 41-day CAR showed a 6.3% (p<0.001) increase, however, none of the dates in
the event window demonstrated an abnormal return differing from zero (Table 4.7). The
hosting of the Olympics did not appear to exert an impact on a given event day, however,
the longer period did demonstrate a positive return. It may be that the business activity
surrounding the Olympics accumulates over time.
Overall, the results of this study indicate that there was no abnormal response in
the index of Brazil to the announcements, or hosting, of international sporting megaevents on a single day. While some other studies do demonstrate that the announcement
of a mega-event can positively impact the stock market for the host country (Leeds,
Mirkitani, & Tang, 2009; Mirman & Sharma, 2010; Veraros, Kasimati, & Dawson,
2004), this study does not identify such an effect on Brazil. It would appear that the
market of Brazil acts indifferently to the announcement of the mega-events and their
hosting. For both event announcements there was a negative CAR which may indicate
pessimism regarding the event announcements over time. There was also a longer term
gain for the Olympic period which may indicate that there is a cumulative effect for
hosting a mega-event, even if each date does not differ from zero. No such effect existed
for the World Cup event.
4.3 STOCK MARKET RESPONSE FOR COMPANIES OF DIFFERING
SPONSORSHIP LEVELS DURING THE 2016 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES
The examination of the Olympic Games had two 11-day event windows, the first
included the trading days during the Olympic Games and the second involved the 11
trading days after the conclusion of the closing ceremonies. Dow and DuPont merged
together in 2017 and historic returns were not available on Yahoo! Finance so they were
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dropped from the analysis. The results of the daily returns using an OLS regression
model during the Olympic Games demonstrated very few abnormal returns on any given
day (Table 4.8). TD Ameritrade had a 2.6% (p=0.049) increase on the trading day for the
opening ceremony, while Citi Bank demonstrated a 3% (p=0.016) increase and United
Airlines demonstrated a 4.6% (p=0.0265) increase. On the third day Omega had a 4.1%
(p=0.002) increase and Philips showed a 2.5% (p=0.0213) increase while Bridgestone
exhibited a 6.6% (p <0.001) decrease. Nike showed a 2.4% (p=0.070) increase on day
four while Unilever showed a 2.1% (p 0.091) increase. Dicks Sporting Goods showed a
7.4% (p <0.001) increase on day seven while ATT showed a 2.2% (p 0.001) decrease.
ATT had another decrease on day nine of 1.2% (p=0.0616) while McDonald’s
demonstrated a 1.7% (p=0.041) decrease on day 10 and Nike increased 3.0% (p=0.0238).
Only three companies demonstrated a Monday effect, BP decreased 0.4% (p=0.069) and
ATT increased 0.2% (p=0.0248) and Panasonic increased 0.05% (p=0.0819).
Following the Olympic Games, Starbucks showed a positive return of 1.7%
(p=0.096) on day three (Table 4.9). On day seven, Hershey saw a 10.7% (p<0.001)
decrease that was likely a result of an acquisition offer that collapsed (Kane, 2016).
Meanwhile, United Airlines demonstrated a 9% (p <0.001) increase following the news
that they hired a new president (Shen, 2016). Unilever had a 3.5% (p=0.004) increase on
day 10 and only ATT demonstrated a Monday effect of 0.2% (p=0.0251) in the PostOlympic period.
Summing the abnormal returns for the Olympic period CAR range between an
11.7% decrease (Samsung) and an 11.9% increase (Dick’s Sporting Goods). On average,
the CAR for the Olympic period was an increase of 1.3%. Overall, 20 of the companies
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(66%) demonstrated a cumulative abnormal return differing from zero during the
Olympic period. During the Post-Olympic period, Samsung had a 22.5% decrease in
CAR and United Airlines had a 9.8% increase. The average CAR for the Post-Olympic
period was a decrease of 0.7%. Overall, 16 companies (53%) demonstrated a cumulative
abnormal return differing from zero during the Post-Olympic period. This would suggest
that while an individual date may not display an abnormal return, the potential exists for
an abnormal response over time.
Subsequent to the analysis of the sponsor stock performance during, and after, the
Rio 2016 Summer Olympic Games, a multiple regression of the CAR’s from the two
periods was conducted. The independent variables for assessment included the BAI of the
company in response to the Olympics, the level of sponsorship (TOP, USOC, Ambush),
whether or not the company was in the technology sector, whether the company was in
the sport sector, the market cap of the company measured in billions of U.S. dollars and
their profitability as measured by ROA.
The cross sectional results of the Olympic period indicate that size, profitability
and being in the tech sector do not seem to matter, which is different than Clark et al.’s
2002 finding that those variables influence returns (Table 4.10). The results also indicate
that being a TOP sponsor or an ambush company do not materially differ in returns from
being a USOC sponsor. It would appear that the level of sponsorship does not impact the
returns of a company in this study. Of interesting note is that having a higher BAI score is
related to a decrease in returns. This may be an additional area of interest as this would
seem to suggest that being more identified with the Olympics can lead to a decrease in
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returns. Finally, being in the sport sector was identified as increasing returns by
approximately 10 percentage points during the Olympic period.
The post-Olympic period results again indicate that a higher BAI corresponds to a
lower return (Table 4.11). It would not appear that any other variables have an influence
on the returns of companies at different sponsorship levels. The advantage of being in the
sport sector during the Olympics also appears to have dissipated following the conclusion
of the Games.
In order to test the robustness of the findings, two additional models were
conducted with the same variables but excluding the companies that had confounding
events within the event window (Dick’s Sporting Goods in Olympic period and Hershey
and United in post-Olympic period) based on the recommendations of Dietz et al. (2012).
The exclusion of the companies with confounding events does not appear to exert
an impact on the interpretation of the results. Even with the exclusion of Dick’s Sporting
Goods, the BAI is negatively related to the returns of a company and being a sport
company positively impacts the returns. The adjusted R-square increased from 0.2755 to
0.329 with the exclusion of Dick’s Sporting Goods (Table 4.12). While the variables in
consideration appear to predict approximately 30% of the returns for the companies in the
sample, that still leaves a large percentage of the cross section of returns unexplained.
The exclusion of Hershey and United Airlines in the post-Olympic window
appears to enhance the effect of BAI on the cross section of returns in the sample. The
adjusted R-square also increased from 0.1362 to 0.3173 with the exclusion of those
companies (4.13). This model suggests that a higher BAI score negatively impacts returns
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in the post-Olympic period, although it has a small overall effect. The other variables in
the model do not appear to have an effect on the returns.
4.4 SUMMARY
The results of the studies generally indicate that the Olympic Games did not have
an effect on the host country of Brazil. It also appears that the decision for Brazil to host
the 2016 Summer Olympic Games did not have an effect on other markets. Moreover, the
companies who have a relationship with the Olympics do not seem to benefit from their
relationship, from a market response perspective. The results of the CAR cross sectional
study would indicate that the companies that are aligned with the sport sector would gain
a market advantage over companies in other sectors. Additionally, those companies rated
higher on affiliation demonstrate a lower return both during, and after, the Olympic
Games that may be worthy of future academic inquiry.
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Table 4.1. Country Results using OLS Rate of Return
Country
Brazil
Spain
Japan
USA
Germany
Australia

Intercept
0.000(0.001)
0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.002)
-0.001(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)

MSCI
0.472(0.041)***
0.315(0.033)***
0.121(0.048)*
0.438(0.032)***
0.305(0.003)***
0.086(0.030)**
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Day -1
0.021(0.027)
0.006(0.021)
-0.004(0.030)
0.012(0.021)
0.004(0.023)
-0.001(0.020)

Day 0
0.011(0.027)
-0.016(0.021)
-0.024(0.030)
-0.002(0.021)
-0.014(0.023)
-0.021(0.020)

Day 1
0.017(0.027)
0.019(0.021)
-0.005(0.030)
0.014(0.021)
0.006(0.023)
-0.001(0.020)

Days 0-5
0.055*
0.022
0.007
0.05*
0.033
0.018

Days -20-20
0.032*
-0.006
-0.03***
0.044***
0.002
0.041***

Day -1
0.021(0.026)
0.006(0.021)
-0.004(0.029)
0.012(0.021)
0.004(0.023)
-0.001(0.020)

Day 0
0.012(0.026)
-0.016(0.021)
-0.024(0.029)
-0.002(0.021)
-0.015(0.023)
-0.021(0.020)

Day 1
0.018(0.026)
0.019(0.021)
-0.006(0.029)
0.012(0.021)
0.006(0.023)
-0.006(0.020)

Days 0-5
0.06**
0.023
0.004
0.05*
0.031
0.012

Days -20-20
0.071***
0.011
-0.05***
0.051***
0.011
0.039***

Table 4.2. Country Results using SUR Rate of Return
Country
Brazil
Spain
Japan
USA
Germany
Australia

Intercept
-0.000(0.001)***
0.000(0.001)***
0.000(0.001)**
-0.001(0.001)***
-0.000(0.001)***
0.000(0.001)**

MSCI
0.455(0.040)
0.312(0.003)
0.127(0.043)
0.439(0.031)
0.306(0.034)
0.088(0.029)

Table 4.3. Country Results using OLS Log Returns
Country
Brazil
Spain
Japan
USA
Germany
Australia

Intercept
0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
-0.001(0.002)
-0.001(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
0.000(0.001)

MSCI
0.468(0.040)***
0.300(0.003)***
0.109(0.047)*
0.437(0.031)***
0.293(0.035)***
0.078(0.030)**

Day -1
0.023(0.027)
0.006(0.022)
-0.00490.030)
0.013(0.021)
0.004(0.023)
-0.001(0.020)

Day 0
0.011(0.026)
-0.016(0.022)
-0.024(0.030)
-0.002(0.0210
-0.015(0.023)
-0.021(0.020)

Day 1
0.017(0.026)
0.019(0.022)
-0.005(0.030)
0.014(0.021)
0.007(0.023)
-0.006(0.020)

Days 0-5
0.064**
0.022
0.01
0.054*
0.033
0.013

Days -20-20
0.036*
-0.02
-0.015
0.048***
0.008
0.055***

Day -1
0.022(0.026)
0.005(0.021)
-0.005(0.029)
0.013(0.021)
0.004(0.023)
-0.002(0.020)

Day 0
0.012(0.022)
-0.016(0.021)
-0.024(0.029)
-0.002(0.021)
-0.015(0.023)
-0.021(0.020)

Day 1
0.017(0.026)
0.019(0.021)
-0.006(0.029)
0.014(0.021)
0.006(0.023)
-0.006(0.020)

Days 0-5
0.061**
0.022
0.005
0.05*
0.032
0.013

Days -20-20
0.067***
-0.005
-0.036**
0.06***
0.015
0.048***

Table 4.4. Country Results using SUR Log Returns
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Country
Brazil
Spain
Japan
USA
Germany
Australia

Intercept
0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
-0.001(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)
-0.000(0.001)

MSCI
0.452(0.039)***
0.296(0.003)***
0.116(0.043)**
0.440(0.031)***
0.293(0.034)***
0.076(0.029)*

Table 4.5. Brazil Mega Event Announcements Rate of Return Results
Announcement
FIFA WC
IOC Olympics

Intercept
Merval
0.000(0.000) 0.849(0.046)***
-0.000(0.001) 0.814(0.040)***

Day -1
0.007(0.009)
0.003(0.019)

Day 0
-0.011(0.009)
0.011(0.019)

Day 1
0.009(0.009)
0.008(0.0019)

Days 0-5
-0.014
0.004

Days -20-20
-0.062***
-0.018*
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Table 4.6. Brazil 2014 World Cup Rate of Return Results
Estimate
Intercept
-0.000
MERVAL
0.214
Day -1
0.012
Day 0
NA
Day 1
-0.004
Day 2
0.019
Day 3
-0.013
Day 4
0.011
Day 5
0.001
Day 6
-0.025
Day 7
0.004
Day 8
-0.016
Day 9
0.006
Day 10
-0.007
Day 11
0.001
Day 12
-0.003
Day 13
-0.004
Day 14
0.017
Day 15
0.004
Day 16
-0.004
Day 17
-0.006
Day 18
0.009
Day 19
0.001
Day 20
0.018
WC CAR
-0.009
Days -20-20
0.005

SE
0
0.043
0.013
NA
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013

T
P
-1.077 0.287
4.907 <0.001
0.954 0.341
NA
NA
-0.31 0.756
1.429 0.154
-1.03 0.304
0.882 0.378
0.092 0.926
-1.927 0.055
0.327 0.743
-1.318 0.189
0.53 0.597
-0.624 0.533
0.125
0.9
-0.292 0.771
-0.338 0.736
1.346 0.179
0.343 0.731
-0.318
0.75
-0.521 0.603
0.704 0.482
0.113
0.91
1.413 0.159
0.218
0.335
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Table 4.7. Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympics Rate of Return Results
Estimate
Intercept
-0.000
MERVAL
0.456
Day -1
0.005
Day 0
0.006
Day 1
>0.000
Day 2
-0.001
Day 3
-0.010
Day 4
0.025
Day 5
0.004
Day 6
NA
Day 7
-0.006
Day 8
0.002
Day 9
-0.007
Day 10
-0.002
Day 11
-0.019
Day 12
-0.005
Day 13
-0.004
Day 14
-0.002
Day 15
0.003
Day 16
0.008
Day 17
0.004
Day 18
-0.005
Day 19
0.003
Day 20
0.017
Olympic CAR
0.037
Days -20-20
0.063

SE
T
P
0.000 0.454 0.996
0.038 11.837 <0.001
0.014 0.366 0.714
0.014 0.421 0.674
0.014 0.013 0.989
0.014 -0.105 0.916
0.014 -0.710 0.478
0.014 1.768 0.078
0.014 0.307 0.759
NA
NA
NA
0.014 -0.483 0.629
0.014 0.199 0.842
0.014 -0.524 0.601
0.014 -0.148 0.882
0.014 -1.357 0.176
0.014 -0.401 0.688
0.014 -0.330 0.741
0.014 -0.168 0.866
0.014 0.268 0.789
0.014
0.54 0.590
0.014
0.28 0.780
0.014 -0.358 0.720
0.014 0.219 0.827
0.014 1.205 0.229
0.002
<0.001

92

Table 4.8. Olympic Period Daily and CAR Results
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Company
AMTD
Atos
BMW
BP
Bridgestone
Bud
Citi
Dicks
GE
Hershey
IBM
Kellogg
Coke
McDonalds

Day 0
0.026*
0.008
0.011
-0.008
-0.012
-0.008
0.03*
0.023
-0.006
0.001
0.004
-0.002
-0.005
0

Day 1
-0.001
0
-0.011
0.005
0.015
-0.007
0.008
0.008
0
-0.009
0
0.003
-0.001
-0.009

Day 2
-0.003
-0.006
0.004
0.004
-0.01
0
0
-0.003
0
-0.005
-0.001
-0.001
0
0

Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6
0.008 0.002 -0.004 0.009
0.006
0 -0.011 0.005
0.003 -0.007 -0.005 0.007
-0.008 0.011 0.003 0.003
-0.066***
na -0.015 0.004
0.006 0.003 0.013 -0.007
-0.003
0
0 0.015
0.003 0.011 0.002 0.004
0 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
0.014 0.016 -0.005
0
0.004 0.004 -0.008 -0.003
0 0.002
0 -0.002
0.004
0 0.006 0.002
0.005
0 0.001 -0.013

Day 7
0.009
-0.006
-0.005
0.016
0.006
0.007
0.015
0.074***
0.003
0
-0.002
-0.01
-0.006
-0.001

Day 8
-0.003
-0.004
0.004
-0.003
0.001
0.002
-0.001
-0.021
0
0.015
-0.003
-0.001
0.003
-0.009

Day 9
-0.001
0.003
-0.003
0.009
0.004
0
-0.005
0.01
0.001
-0.005
0.003
0.002
0
-0.002

Day 10
0.009
0
-0.012
-0.008
0
-0.002
0.004
0.008
-0.005
0.004
-0.006
0
-0.003
-0.017*

CAR
0.051***
-0.005
-0.014
0.024*
-0.073**
0.007
0.063***
0.119***
-0.016***
0.026*
-0.008
-0.009*
0
-0.045***
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Company
Michelin
Nike
Omega
Panasonic
Pepsi
PandG
Phillips
Samsung
Starbucks
Siemens
ATT
UA
United
Unilever
Visa

Day 0
0.01
0.011
0.003
0.013
-0.003
-0.008
-0.002
-0.002
0
0
-0.003
0.019
0.046*
0.005
-0.002

Day 1
0.004
0.003
-0.004
-0.016
-0.004
0
0.013
-0.001
-0.01
0.007
-0.008
0
0.001
-0.007
0

Day 2
0
-0.004
0.005
0.014
0
0.002
0.017
-0.029
-0.003
-0.001
0.002
-0.009
-0.012
0.009
0

Day 3
0.002
-0.008
0.041**
0
0.006
0.005
0.025*
-0.038
0.01
-0.004
0.003
0.001
-0.009
-0.008
-0.002

Day 4
0.004
0.024.
-0.002
na
-0.006
0.001
0
-0.011
-0.007
0.009
0.001
0.039
0
0.021.
0

Day 5
-0.007
-0.004
0.006
-0.011
0
0.003
-0.001
-0.031
0
0.001
-0.002
0.004
0
-0.004
-0.001

Day 6
0.002
0.003
0.001
-0.008
0
-0.002
0.009
na
-0.008
-0.004
-0.01
0.027
0.014
0.001
0.009

Day 7 Day 8 Day 9
-0.007 0.005
0.004
0.006 -0.002
0.004
0.004
0.01
0.011
0.021 0.021
0.013
-0.003 0.002 -0.003
-0.001 0.003
0.003
0.007 0.004
0.011
-0.004 -0.02
0.019
0.007 0.005 -0.007
-0.007 0.006
0.001
-0.022** -0.004 -0.012.
0.025 -0.012
0
0.007 0.003 -0.012
-0.01 0.007 -0.012
0.004
0
-0.01

Day 10
0.005
0.03*
0.002
0.005
0
0
0.004
0
-0.009
0.011
-0.009
0.024
-0.007
0
0.003

CAR
0.022**
0.063***
0.077***
0.052**
-0.011**
0.006
0.087***
-0.117***
-0.022**
0.019**
-0.064***
0.118***
0.031
0.002
0.001

Table 4.9. Post-Olympic Period Daily and CAR Results

95

Company
AMTD
Atos
BMW
BP
Bridgestone
Bud
Citi
Dicks
GE
Hershey
IBM
Kellogg
Coke
McDonalds

Day 1
-0.007
0.005
0
-0.006
0.013
-0.007
0.005
0.004
0.002
0.001
0
0
-0.005
0.001

Day 2
0.006
0.01
-0.004
0.001
0.003
0.006
-0.003
-0.003
-0.005
-0.004
0
-0.006
0.001
-0.004

Day 3
0.011
-0.01
-0.002
0.01
0
0
0.011
0
0.004
-0.016
-0.002
-0.003
0.002
0.003

Day 4
0.015
-0.009
-0.005
0
0.01
0
0.004
0.002
0
0
-0.001
0.004
-0.003
0.005

Day 5
0.02
0.003
0.006
0
0.003
0
0.012
0
0.001
0
0
-0.006
-0.007
-0.008

Day 6
-0.005
0
0
-0.001
0.001
0
-0.003
0.007
-0.001
0.002
0.003
0.006
0
0.002

Day 7
0.02
0.001
0.007
-0.002
0.009
-0.006
0.018
-0.004
0.001
-0.107***
0
-0.01
-0.006
0.008

Day 8
0.004
-0.008
0.002
-0.005
0.002
-0.008
0.001
-0.002
-0.002
0.003
0
0.005
0.005
0.003

Day 9
-0.01
0.008
0.006
-0.007
0.005
0.006
-0.006
0.002
-0.002
-0.004
0.004
-0.007
-0.002
-0.003

Day 10
0.01
-0.008
-0.008
0.018
0
0.011
0
0
-0.002
-0.006
-0.003
0.005
0.004
0

Day 11
na
-0.002
-0.003
na
0
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na

CAR
0.064***
-0.01
-0.001
0.008
0.046***
0.002
0.039***
0.006
-0.004
-0.131**
0.001
-0.012*
-0.011*
0.007
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Company
Michelin
Nike
Omega
Panasonic
Pepsi
PandG
Phillips
Samsung
Starbucks
Siemens
ATT
UA
United
Unilever
Visa

Day 1
-0.004
-0.003
-0.001
0.003
-0.002
-0.005
-0.006
0.002
0.015
-0.004
-0.005
0.007
-0.003
-0.013
0.009

Day 2
0.003
0.014
-0.008
-0.002
-0.002
0.004
0
-0.012
0.007
0
-0.003
0.011
0.011
-0.001
-0.006

Day 3
0.002
0.014
-0.021
-0.001
0.004
0.002
0.014
-0.038
0.017.
0.006
0.002
-0.001
0.01
-0.006
-0.001

Day 4
-0.006
-0.015
-0.01
-0.007
-0.001
0.007
0
-0.029
0.005
0
0.005
-0.012
0.001
0.009
0.001

Day 5
-0.001
-0.002
-0.007
0.013
-0.003
-0.002
0
-0.034
0.001
0.002
-0.009
-0.003
-0.01
0.003
0.004

Day 6
0.002
-0.011
-0.009
-0.017
0.001
0.004
-0.003
0.02
-0.015
0
0.001
0.003
-0.006
na
0

Day 7
-0.004
-0.009
-0.002
0.007
-0.006
-0.007
0.004
-0.022
-0.004
-0.002
-0.002
-0.01
0.09***
-0.002
0.005

Day 8
0.002
-0.004
-0.003
0.014
0.003
0.001
-0.003
-0.033
0
-0.009
0
-0.041
-0.006
-0.008
-0.001

Day 9
-0.005
0.018
0.013
0.007
0.004
0.011
0.013
-0.04
0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.011
-0.001
0.004

Day 10
-0.006
-0.01
-0.003
-0.003
0.002
-0.004
0.005
-0.018
-0.006
0.003
-0.003
-0.035
0
0.035**
0.003

Day 11
-0.002
na
0.009
-0.01
na
na
na
-0.021
na
-0.003
na
na
na
-0.003
na

CAR
-0.019***
-0.008
-0.042***
0.004
0
0.011*
0.024**
-0.225***
0.021*
-0.007
-0.013**
-0.079**
0.098**
0.013
0.018**

Table 4.10. Olympic Period CAR Results

Intercept
BAI
Ambush
TOP
Tech
Sport
Size(B$)
ROA
R-square

Estimate
0.0210
-0.0003
0.0249
-0.0165
0.0131
0.1058
-2.7e-15
0.272
0.2755

LB
-0.0113
-0.0006
-0.0277
-0.0658
-0.0492
0.0289
-1.4e-14
-0.7610

UB
0.0534
0.0000
0.0775
0.0329
0.0755
0.1826
8.6e-15
1.305

SE
0.0013
0.0001
0.0253
0.0237
0.0300
0.0369
5.5E-15
0.496

T
1.348
-2.763
0.984
-0.694
0.437
2.864
-0.501
0.548

P
0.1918
0.0116
0.3364
0.4952
0.6666
0.0092
0.6212
0.5893
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Table 4.11. Post-Olympic Period CAR Results

Intercept
BAI
Ambush
TOP
Tech
Sport
Size(B$)
ROA
R-square

Estimate
0.01834
-0.003
0.0173
0.0150
-0.0422
-0.0108
4.9e-15
-0.0407
0.1362

LB
-0.0203
-0.0006
-0.0454
-0.0438
-0.1166
-0.1024
-8.7e-15
-1.6405

UB
0.0570
-0.00001
0.0801
0.0740
0.0322
0.0808
1.8e-14
0.8247

SE
0.0185
0.0001
0.0302
0.0283
0.0357
0.0440
6.5e-16
0.5927

T
0.987
-2.180
0.573
0.532
-1.18
-0.246
0.746
-0.688

P
0.3350
0.0407
0.5725
0.600
0.2513
0.8084
0.4639
0.4989

Table 4.12. Olympic Period CAR results excluding Dicks Sporting Goods

Intercept
BAI
Ambush
TOP
Tech
Sport
Size(B$)
ROA
R-square

Estimate
0.0126
-0.0003
0.0344
-0.0054
0.0113
0.1099
-1.9e-15
0.1552
0.329

LB
-0.0176
-0.0005
-0.0141
-0.0513
-0.0453
0.0400
-1.2e-14
-0.789

UB
0.0430
-0.00009
0.0829
0.0404
0.0680
0.1798
8.4e-15
1.099

SE
0.0145
0.0001
0.0232
0.0220
0.0271
0.0335
4.9e-15
0.4527

T
0.870
-2.939
1.478
-0.249
0.418
3.281
-0.397
0.343

P
0.3945
0.0081
0.1550
0.8057
0.6804
0.0037
0.6958
0.7352
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Table 4.13. Post-Olympic Period CAR Results excluding Hershey and United Airlines

Intercept
BAI
Ambush
TOP
Tech
Sport
Size(B$)
ROA
R-square

Estimate
0.0221
-0.0003
0.0094
0.0057
-0.0396
-0.0132
3.50e-15
-0.1904
0.3173

LB
-0.0106
-0.0005
-0.0415
-0.0428
-0.0983
-0.0856
-7.2e-15
-1.1731

UB
0.0549
-0.00009
0.0605
0.0544
0.0190
0.0592
1.1e-14
0.7922

SE
0.0156
0.0001
0.0244
0.0232
0.0280
0.0346
5.1e-15
0.4695

T
1.414
-2.885
0.389
0.249
-1.415
-0.382
0.682
-0.406

P
0.1736
0.0095
0.7019
0.8060
0.1733
0.7065
0.5036
0.6895

CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
The results of the analysis provide additional insight to the body of literature
surrounding mega-events from both a country, and company, perspective. Specifically,
the results of this study evaluate mega-events on the market of a single host country,
Brazil, and the market performance of sponsoring companies during and after the
Olympics.
5.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The announcement by the IOC of the host city for an upcoming Summer Olympic
Games is met with mixed enthusiasm by the stock market participants in that country,
with some demonstrating a positive return (Leeds, Mirikitani & Tang, 2009; Veraros,
Kasimati & Dawson, 2004) and others demonstrating a neutral response (Berman, Brooks
& Davidson, 2000; Mirman & Sharma, 2010). The results of this study do not indicate
that any market response occurred for Brazil, following the pattern of Mirman and
Sharma. The present study examined the impact of the IOC announcement that Rio de
Janeiro was awarded the 2016 Summer Games on the stock market of Brazil and those of
losing countries, Japan, Spain and the U.S., as well as control countries, Germany and
Australia. The event day in question did not impact the markets, either positively or
negatively, for any of the countries identified. This was the case for both an OLS
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estimation of rate of return as well as log returns and SUR for both. While Brazil was the
only country to demonstrate a slightly positive response (1.1%), none of the returns were
abnormal. It would appear, at least in this instance, that the IOC decision for hosting was
met with a neutral response in 2009. This finding is especially interesting considering
some Brazilian officials were engaging in a bribery scheme in an effort to influence the
decision (Panja, 2019). Ostensibly, at least some element of the bribery activity was to
spur business activity in Brazil. There was a longer-term gain for Brazil, both in the five
days surrounding the announcement and during the 41-day event window. This may
suggest that while an individual day is neutral, that the Brazil market takes time to absorb
and process mega-event information.
This finding was extended for an examination of the market response of Brazil to
multiple mega-events in close succession. The results do not suggest that any reaction to
the event announcements elicits a daily response. However, for both mega-event
announcements there existed a cumulative abnormal loss that differs from zero. If part of
the rationale for mega-event hosting is for economic gain and an announcement serves as
a signal for that gain (Martins & Serra, 2011), then a response would be expected. Since
their existed a negative return over time, it may be that investors are pessimistic about the
long-term outlook of the mega-event and its ability to generate a positive economic
return.
The lack of abnormal daily response was observed for both the event
announcements, event time frames and performance of the Brazilian soccer team. This
distinct lack of identified abnormal effect suggests that international sport hosting and
competition does not impact the Brazilian stock market on a daily basis. This is contrary
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to findings of Edmans et. al (2007) that international competition affects the market of
the home country. Even though Brazil was the host country of the 2014 FIFA World Cup
and the Brazilian National Team was eliminated in the semi-finals and consolation
match, no impact was observed on the Brazilian stock market.
A holding period over the duration of a mega-event demonstrated a loss of 0.9%
during the World Cup and a gain of 3.7% for the Olympics. This would suggest that
while there may not an abnormal return on a single day, there may be a gain or loss over
time. It would also appear that the mega-events do not illicit the same response; the FIFA
World Cup did not demonstrate any abnormal activity during, or around the World Cup,
while the Olympic Games generated a positive cumulative return both during, and
surrounding, the Games. There was also a differing conclusion using MSCI and
MERVAL to the IOC announcement; BOVESPA displayed a positive CAR benchmarked
to the MSCI but a negative CAR using the MERVAL.
The analysis of the event timeline in question relied on using the neighboring
Argentina stock market index (MERVAL) rather than the international index due to
availability. While the use of the neighbor country has been recommended (Gerlach,
2011), it could, nevertheless, impact the results, which is a limitation of the present study.
The analysis of the sponsoring companies for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games
demonstrated a largely benign daily response of the Olympic Games on the market return
of the sponsoring companies. Very few individual days during, or after, the Olympics
elicited an abnormal response, and the abnormal response of three companies (Dick’s
Sporting Goods, Hershey and United Airlines) were unrelated to their Olympics
involvement. An SUR was not conducted because this would require equal observations
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for all individual models, and with non-synchronous trading, the observations would need
to be adjusted which may impact the results. However, there were several companies who
displayed a cumulative abnormal response both during (66%) and following the
Olympics (53%) which would suggest that returns can accumulate over time. The
magnitude of the cumulative returns differs greatly with an average return of 1.3% during
the Olympic Games and a loss of 0.7% following the Games.
A cross-sectional regression was performed to examine the impact of the level of
sponsorship, affiliation index score, company size, company sector and profitability on
the returns of the companies and no effect was identified for the level of sponsorship. The
results of this study indicate that there is no immediate market advantage gained from
being a TOP sponsor or USOC sponsor above an ambushing company. However, the
benefits of sponsorship may not be reflected in the market returns of the event window
studied, or might also occur to the sponsoring company in a different way. It may also be
that there are other non-market, intangible benefits that occur to an official sponsor, such
as hospitality for potential and existing clients and top-performing employees, that
official sponsors are able to leverage (Stotlar & Nagel, 2017).
Sponsoring firms may utilize the sponsorship as a mechanism to engage with an
international consumer base in order to demonstrate a product, understand their needs and
develop a contact list (Noori, 2012). Firms may also be using the international nature of
the mega-event to build a brand image and connect that image with the event to grow
their business (Meenaghan, 2001). In addition, firms may use their official relationship as
a way to communicate with consumers and use their status as a mechanism to support the
organizations they align with. Olympic sponsors may contribute a portion of their sales to
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a foundation that supports athletes, so supporting the sponsor would be seen as
supporting the athletes (Polonsky & Speed, 2001).
It is also possible that a sponsor is utilizing the sponsorship as a means to
maintain market share and a competitive advantage over a competing company. If this is
the case, then looking at the rate of return for a sponsor and a non-identified, nonsponsor, control company for differences during a mega-event timeframe may indicate to
what level a firm is achieving a market advantage. Since there are many objectives that
managers pursue when evaluating marketing potential, without knowing the motivation
for each firm, it is speculation. While a market perspective examines an event for a
financial return, it is narrow in focus and does not fully capture the range of business
objectives.
The results of the present study indicate that the BAI score is negatively related to
returns, both during, and after, the Olympic event period. This finding may be worthy of
future consideration as it measures how closely related a brand is with the Olympics and
a negative relationship would suggest that more closely aligned brands have negative
returns, regardless of their sponsorship status, size or industry sector. The current results
differ from the findings of Clark, et al (2002) who identified that technology companies
have superior performance. The analysis yields no positive impact for technology
companies, but a positive impact for sporting companies that may be the result of a
natural congruence these companies have with an international athletic competition such
as the Olympics. There is also no effect for either the size of a company or their
profitability in terms of performance during or after the Olympics.
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Overall, this study did not find a market advantage to official sponsorship of the
2016 Summer Olympic Games, however it was identified that companies in the sport
sector substantially benefit during the Olympics. Companies in the sport sector saw a
10% rate of return during the Games that dissipated post Games suggesting that sport
companies can achieve a positive market return during a sport mega-event. Since this is
likely the first study that examined the market response during the Olympics, it is not
known if other Olympic Games or mega-events demonstrate a similar finding, which is
an area for future academic inquiry.
5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY
The results of the present study help to further the inquiry of sporting megaevents and the market response of host countries and sponsoring companies. Specifically,
this study focused on mega-events as they related to a single country (Brazil). This helps
to isolate any effects to a single country rather than in aggregate (Hundt & Horsch, 2019).
While other studies have identified a positive, although short lived, abnormal return in
response to a host country announcement (Fah & Hai, 2014; Leeds, Mirikitani & Tang,
2009; Veraros, Kasimati & Dawson, 2004), the current study did not identify such a
result. There is also no finding of a negative response for “losing” countries of a host
country announcement, which support other such findings (Dick & Wang, 2010; Sullivan
& Leeds, 2016). This would suggest that mega-events do not exert an equal effect on all
participants and that each mega-event is unique in its market potential. It could also be
that market participants are increasingly aware that hosting may not lead to increased
economic benefits, and even display negative effects, that are not viewed as an attractive
investment opportunity.
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This study also contributes to the body of literature regarding company stock
returns in response to their sponsorship. This study utilized the 2016 Summer Olympic
Games and the post-Olympic period to ascertain their impact on the market returns of the
sponsoring companies. There was no significant change identified for companies based
on sponsorship level, however, there was an effect noticed for those companies in the
sport sector and their BAI score. Additionally, three companies achieved abnormal
returns during one of the two event windows unrelated to the Olympics. It does not
appear, at least in the present sample, that being a TOP sponsor leads to greater-thanexpected market returns. Since it is expected that new information moves stock prices,
perhaps the expected returns are already reflected in the stock price, as suggested by the
EMH, or Olympic sponsorship is not expected to lead to greater future returns.
This study also utilized an OLS regression model for rate of return as well as log
returns and a SUR model for the assessment of returns given the contemporaneous event
timeline for the IOC Rio de Janeiro Summer Olympic Games announcement. The
analysis indicates that the OLS and SUR models achieve a similar output with our
samples. It does not appear that a SUR model improves the estimations and the only
potential advantage gained is one of efficiency. There was not a meaningful difference in
rate of return or log returns in the sample. While it has been suggested that log returns
follow a more normal distribution and their use improves estimation (Hudson &
Gregoriou, 2015), this study does not note a meaningful difference. It may be that the log
returns may depend on the use of weekly or monthly returns, rather than daily returns to
improve estimations.
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5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
If mega-events are to be an economic driver that countries hope them to be
(Tomlinson, Bass & Bassett, 2011), then continued inquiry is recommended to ascertain
whether that is the case or not. When countries engage in mega-event hosting for
economic reasons, they may also be taking a longer term view of increased tourism visits
and expenditures, as well as infrastructure improvements that may take years to develop
beyond the host dates, which is beyond the scope of this project to identify. Moreover,
there are billions of dollars being spent on sponsorships worldwide (IEG, 2018) and it
does not appear that there is a clear market advantage to such sponsorship outlays. If the
companies are utilizing the sponsorship for intangible benefits, this should be
communicated to the shareholders who may be questioning the legitimacy of such
spending. Researchers are encouraged to continue to examine the effect that sponsorship
has on the returns of the host community.
There has been robust inquiry into the impact of mega-event hosting on the
returns of the host country and each country, and event, appears to be different. There has
also been many researchers examining the market returns of sponsorship, but those are
generally focused on announcements, rather than the actual event. Events provide unique
opportunities for official sponsors, and ambushers, to both leverage and activate their
brand for commercial success. This study provides an examination of such event and
post-event windows without any such advantage identified. Other researchers should
continue to examine the returns during actual sporting events to determine whether a
market response is present, perhaps utilizing additional methodologies.
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One potential additional method is to evaluate the performance of an official
sponsor with a non-sponsor, non-advertising, non-affiliated control company. A
difference in differences for the rate of return for the companies prior to, during and after
an event may help to better isolate the specific effect that sponsorship has. If a sponsor is
able to achieve a greater post-event return compared to their pre-event return in relation
to a competitor, then more information regarding the impact of mega-event sponsorship
can be identified.
Another area of inquiry is in the statistical utilization of a Type I sum of squares
that examines the impact of each variable on the rate of return of the company in
isolation. This is in contrast to the typical Type III sum of squares usually employed in
multiple regression that examines the effect of each variable after accounting for the
other variables in the model. The Type I will allow for the interpretation of each
variable’s direct effect on the rate of return of the companies in the sample, thereby
demonstrating the contribution of each individual variable and identification of variables
that exert the largest impact.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This study examined the impact of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de
Janeiro on the host country and sponsorship companies. Unlike other studies, no effect
was identified for the IOC decision for Rio de Janeiro to host over cities in other
countries. Additionally, specific to Brazil, this study failed to identify any effect on the
market of Brazil in response to mega-event hosting. Lastly, the results of the present
study indicate that there is no clear advantage gained from USOC, TOP sponsorship or
ambush marketing using a market perspective. The decisions to sponsor is individual for
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the companies, but does not appear to impact returns. The study did identify a positive
effect for companies in the sport sector, which may further provide support for the
importance of congruence in sponsorship. We also find evidence that the BAI score is
related to a decrease in returns that is worthy of more academic inquiry.
Mega-events continue to dominate fan interest and attract billions of dollars in
broadcasting and sponsorship dollars that may, ultimately, fail to provide a positive return
for those companies involved. If part of a company’s purpose is to increase market value
to shareholders, then mega-events may not be an appropriate vehicle for that objective
particularly since the financial and time investment is considerable. Future studies should
continue to investigate the relationship between sponsors and mega-events for mutually
beneficial relationships.
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